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Genetically engineered (GE), virus resistant papaya was widely and rapidly 
adopted by Hawaiian growers in the late 1990’s.  Yet, developing countries that stand 
to benefit from this technology have failed to approve GE papaya, despite the fact that 
it is close to an ideal pro-poor genetically engineered crop. In Thailand, where papaya 
is a staple food, virus infection rates in some areas are as high as 100%.  There, GE, 
virus-resistant papaya has become the “poster child,” both literally and figuratively, 
for the debate over agricultural biotechnology and is perceived as a gateway to other 
genetically engineered crops. In this collection of reports and articles I examine the 
political and social factors that have stymied the technology, focusing on the case in 
Thailand.  Each chapter was written with the goal of increasing awareness of this issue 
among different audiences in a distinct style that targets a specified readership.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sixty percent of Americans believe they have not eaten genetically engineered (GE) 
foods, even though most processed foods contain GE ingredients (Mellman Group, 
Inc., 2006). Interestingly, when Americans are informed that GE food is already a 
main ingredient in commonly consumed groceries, the percentage of people who say 
that GE food is safe, increases by ten percent (National Science Board, 2008).  
Scientists are ranked as the reliable source from whom Americans want to receive 
such information (Mellman Group, 2006). 
There is a stated need to increase the public’s understanding of, and 
engagement with, science.  Some assert that those with a fluency in the language of 
science are best poised to undertake the challenge of bridging the laboratory with the 
living room.  In an age of increasing scientific complexity, concurrent with public 
complacency and politicization of science, there is a call for scientists to turn from the 
bench and take time to explain their research to the public and engage in a dialogue 
about its implications (Leshner, 2007).  Arguably, they are the best to take up the task, 
since Americans’ confidence in scientific leadership is higher than for any other 
institution except the military (National Science Board, 2008).  However, few 
scientists have the time or the training to do so. 
 Through my own scientific training to the Master’s level, I achieved fluency in 
the language of plant science to meet this challenge.  My interdisciplinary tendencies, 
widespread interest in a range of scientific issues, and interest in the craft of writing 
compelled me to the task.  Leaving the laboratory to travel to the places where science 
occurs and meet the people who make the discoveries was appealing.  In a novel PhD 
program in the plant sciences at Cornell University, I combined my scientific training 
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with a writing curriculum to address the gap between science and the general public.  
Much more than translate science, I hoped to craft stories that hooked the reader, 
offered controversy for consideration, and provided a lesson in science that was easy 
to follow.  That was the challenge. 
 Creating a non-standard PhD program, for which there was no precedent in my 
field of study at Cornell, meant creating a curriculum.  Having passed my A exam, my 
coursework in science was complete.  The challenge was to obtain training in writing 
and journalism, without a journalism program at the institution.  Classes directly 
relevant to the discipline were limited so I turned to internships. As professional fields 
tend to go, you have to have experience to get experience.  I needed published articles, 
“clips” to get to the next rung in the ladder.  I began locally: an internship with the 
Cornell News Service writing press releases and brief science articles for the weekly 
paper that promotes activities at Cornell resulted in a collection of several clips.  
Subsequently, as a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS) Mass Media Fellows Program, I was assigned to the science desk at 
the Raleigh News and Observer for ten weeks.  In this sink or swim environment, I 
learned the language of journalism and tricks of the trade; how to interview, find a 
story within a story, the importance of the news hook, pitching ideas to the editor, and 
how to measure one's story in inches.  I left the News and Observer with a front-page 
story and a portfolio of clips from North Carolina’s largest newspaper.   
In addition, I joined the National Association of Science Writers and began 
attending their meetings and workshops.  The annual AAAS meeting, where perhaps 
the highest concentration of science writers gathers, offered more on-the-ground 
training as well as valuable networking opportunities.  A week-long course at the 
Santa Fe Science Writing Workshop also complemented Cornell’s course offerings.  I 
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was learning the craft of writing and it was time to apply that to a well-researched 
dissertation topic.   
 
Choosing a Topic 
My training and continued matriculation in the graduate field of Plant Biology was the 
first criterion of honing in on a research topic.  Few topics in the plant sciences are as 
controversial as that of genetic engineering (GE), so I turned to this larger debate.  
During a long bus ride through Southern India, Anthony Shelton and I discussed the 
story of GE papaya in Hawaii, the compelling reasons for its adoption, and the tragedy 
that other countries have failed to adopt the technology.  After doing preliminary 
research on various examples of plant genetic engineering, I found the story of 
genetically engineered papaya to be most compelling.  Unlike most transgenic 
products, papaya is a horticultural crop grown on a much smaller scale than 
commodities such as maize or rice, divorcing it from trade issues and economics.  
What’s more, the genetically engineered papaya remains the only commercialized 
transgenic that was developed by university researchers with public funds, which 
eliminated the controversy over multinational seed monopolies.  From a scientific 
perspective, the modification to the papaya is relatively benign, and no foreign or 
inter-specific substance is produced in the transgenic papaya.  The GE papaya was 
engineered to be resistant to a virus for which there are currently no other feasible 
means of control.  Despite that farmers in Hawaii had been growing transgenic papaya 
for several years, the technology has failed to be adopted in many of the developing 
countries that stand to benefit from the technology, furthering the controversy.  
Uncovering the reasons that this technology failed outside of Hawaii promised a 
rewarding research endeavor.  The case defied many of the standard arguments against 
genetic engineering and the telling of the story could be crafted to appeal to diverse 
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audiences; from policy makers to lay readers discerning what to put in their grocery 
carts. 
 
Challenges and Opportunities 
Undertaking an interdisciplinary PhD program presented both logistic and intellectual 
challenges.  Logistically, funding was scarce.  The funding opportunities available to 
graduate students to undertake interdisciplinary work outside of the standard 
categories for graduate research are limited.  I was fortunate to be considered for and 
awarded the William Frederick Dreer Award by the Department of Horticulture at 
Cornell.   Without this award, the on-the-ground research I was able to do in Thailand 
would not have been possible.  The reality that there are few funds for most 
interdisciplinary projects in science severely limits the experience of the young 
scientists coming out of PhD programs.  Yet, it is such experience that is most needed 
in today’s world. 
Teaching opportunities helped fill the funding void.  Of particular relevance is 
the Buttrick Crippen Fellowship, which provided the opportunity to design and teach a 
freshman writing seminar on science writing.  The design of the course largely 
reflected my own training process in science writing, boiled down to a single semester 
geared towards freshman.  Many of the exercises I found useful in the courses and 
internships I experienced appeared on my syllabus.  The assignments I created were 
revision-intense; reflective of the proportion of time I spent on writing compared to 
revising.  The opportunity to “preach” while practicing gave me insight into my own 
process as a writer.  
Parallel to my dual roles of practitioner and preacher of writing, I also was 
confronted with the mixed roles of expert and journalist.  As I prepared my own 
articles for publication, I was interviewed by a journalist at Science, who was crafting 
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his own story about genetically engineered papaya.  When first approached, I felt 
scooped.  After conducting years of research on the topic, this seasoned writer would 
nab my perspective and have it published within the month in a high impact 
publication.  Yet, from his perspective, I was an academic researcher who has a global 
view on the controversy.  I was not a science journalist.  Prior to the interview I 
provided him with a list of other key players to interview and prepared my own media 
messages that I wanted to articulate.  I had garnered an authoritative grasp on the 
controversy, had familiarity with most of the key players, and knew the sequence of 
events and political controversy surrounding GE papaya.  I was an informed expert 
and a good source.  The article was published in April of 2008 1.  I was fairly quoted 
in the article and the journalist included a plug for an article I had written to be 
published the following month.  My experience balancing the roles of journalist and 
expert was a positive one.   
 
The Anatomy of the Dissertation 
The challenge of this dissertation in writing about an issue in the plant sciences was 
one of addressing audience.  The chapters that follow are a series of reports and 
articles that are all about the case of genetically engineered papaya, but written for 
distinct audiences.  The language, content and framework of each article were crafted 
with specific target audiences in mind.  
In the first chapter I present a case study written to inform policy makers in 
Thailand and neighboring countries about a specific example of biotechnology 
relevant to the region.  The second chapter is written for plant biologists.  The aim of 
                                                
1 Papaya Takes on Ringspot Virus and Wins, By Erik Stokstad.  Science Magazine 25 
April 2008 320: 472 
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the article was to illustrate the non-science based downstream challenges that affect 
the ability of biotechnology research to have impact on farmers.  The third chapter is a 
news item written in response to a time-sensitive news hook.  This process of writing 
this chapter is elaborated in the appendix.  The fourth chapter is written for students of 
plant physiology and is an except from a textbook.  The fifth chapter is a magazine-
style article written for a well-read lay audience with no presumed background in 
science.  The final chapter is an example of primary research.  In this article I report 
the results of a survey on farmer perceptions of biotechnology and genetically 
engineered papaya in northeast Thailand.  It is written for an audience of social 
scientists. 
What unifies these chapters is that each tells the story of genetically engineered 
papaya in Thailand.  The technology stood to benefit small-scale farmers in 
developing countries, but is largely failing due to a lack of political will. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE GENETICALLY MODIFIED (GM) PRSV RESISTANT PAPAYA IN 
THAILAND:  A CASE STUDY FOR THE AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN THE GMS SUB-REGION 
 
For Policy Makers 
What follows is a case study on genetically engineered papaya in Thailand written for 
policy makers.  This case study was part of a project between the Asian Development 
Bank and The National Science and Technology Development Agency in Thailand 
titled “Strengthening Capacity and Regional Cooperation in Advanced Agricultural 
Science and Technology in the Greater Mekong Subregion.”  The project 
commissioned a series of reports to provide basic awareness about advanced 
agricultural science and technology and related food safety issues among policy 
makers in countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion.  It was published in June, 2006 
and revised for this dissertation in April, 2009.1 
 
Executive Summary 
Papaya is one of the most nutritious and culturally important food crops in 
Thailand and much of Southeast Asia.  It is a rich source of vitamins A and C and 
indirectly enhances iron uptake.  Papaya is especially important as a subsistence crop 
grown in backyard gardens of the rural poor.  In Thailand papaya is consumed not 
                                                
1 Davidson, S. N. (2006). The Genetically Modified (GM) PRSV Resistant Papaya in 
Thailand:  A case study for the agricultural biotechnoloy policy development in the 
GMS Sub-RegionReport: AGRICO. 
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only as a ripe, fresh fruit, but several times daily in the form of green papaya salad, or 
som tam. 
Unfortunately, papaya is plagued world wide by the papaya ringspot virus (PRSV), 
for which there has traditionally been no effective means of control.  In recent years, 
the tools of biotechnology and genetic engineering (GE) have enabled the 
development of PRSV-resistant papaya.  GE PRSV-resistant papaya has been grown 
and consumed in Hawaii, USA for nearly ten years and has been developed and tested 
for use in Thailand.  Other countries including Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Bangladesh are genetically engineering a PRSV-resistant papaya.  
Despite promising successes by plant scientists in developing PRSV-resistant 
papaya, western-based and local activist groups, which have zero-tolerance policies 
regarding genetic engineering, are actively opposed to the deployment of GE PRSV-
resistant papaya.  These groups have contributed significantly to delaying the 
deployment of PRSV-resistant papaya in Thailand and other developing countries and 
have encouraged policy makers to make additional assessment of the technology by 
urging them to invest in developing alternative solutions that do not employ genetic 
engineering.   
Ultimately the fate of GE PRSV-resistant papaya is in the hands of policy makers 
of individual countries who will have to determine to what extent this nutritious fruit 
will be readily accessible to resource poor farmers in Southeast Asia. 
In this case study we will examine the development of GE-PRSV-resistant papaya 
for Hawaii by the Cornell University/ University of Hawaii team spearheaded by Dr. 
Dennis Gonsalves.  In addition, projects initiated to develop a similar papaya for 
Thailand by a collaborative effort between the Gonsalves group and the Thailand 
Department of Agriculture will be examined, with reference to other Thailand-based 
projects, such as the Kasetsart University-based project, which is part of the Southeast 
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Asia Papaya Biotechnology Network.  Within this context, a discussion of the 
regulatory frameworks that oversee these projects and the opposition to their 
development will be discussed. 
 
I. The Genetic Modification of Papaya for Papaya Ringspot Virus (PRSV) 
Resistance.   
 
A.  Pathogen Derived Resistance 
  Pathogen derived resistance (PDR) refers to the strategy of “immunizing” a 
plant against a foreign disease by introducing some component of the pathogen’s own 
genetic material into the plant.  This concept was first described by Sanford and 
Johnston in 1985 when genetic engineering was in its infancy [1].   Plant viruses have 
traditionally proved extremely difficult to control and PDR offered a new approach to 
plant virologists.  Researchers in Roger Beachy’s laboratory and at Monsanto 
Company first showed that this technique could control viruses in 1986 when they 
generated plants that expressed the coat protein (CP) gene of the Tobacco Mosaic 
virus in tobacco [2].  This type of PDR became known as Coat Protein-Mediated 
Resistance (CPMR) and remains the single most promising approach to conferring 
resistance to viruses in cases where no naturally occurring resistance is known.  
 Plants have an inherent system to detect and protect themselves against viruses 
by destroying the genetic material viruses require to replicate within their hosts.  By 
expressing a component of the virus in the plant, such as the coat protein gene, plants 
turn on this protection system and are essentially “immunized” to the virus.  This can 
be conceptualized analogously to how humans, when injected with a vaccine against 
the virus that causes Polio, can successfully avoid infection from that virus.   
11 
 Before the tools of genetic engineering were developed and made widely 
available, many plant virologists used a similar strategy called cross protection.  In 
cross protection, a mild form of the virus was used to inoculate plants, thereby turning 
on their defense system.  When plants are subsequently challenged with a more severe 
and detrimental strain of the virus, they are not infected because of the prior 
immunization with a mild strain.  Although this strategy worked to varying degrees in 
plants, it was never entirely successful and it was extremely labor intensive, as each 
plant had to be treated with the mild strain.  It is therefore, not practical for farmers 
who save their seeds, as immunity is not transmitted from generation to generation. 
 It is within this context that Dennis Gonsalves  at Cornell University in 
Geneva, New York  and his research team began looking for a way to control the 
PRSV in papaya in the early 1990’s.  The goal was to overcome the challenges of 
cross protection by inserting a viral gene encoding the coat protein directly into the 
plant genome using the tools of genetic engineering.  In this way, the plant is 
inherently protected and can pass that trait on to its progeny. 
 
B.  Transformation Techniques 
 Another milestone that facilitated the development of the first PRSV-resistant 
papaya plants was the development of the so-called “gene gun,” formerly referred to 
as microprojectile bombardment.  Using this method, metal particles are coated with 
the DNA of interest, in this case the coat protein gene.  The gene is not a lone 
fragment but rather is carried inside a larger circular DNA fragment referred to as a 
vector.   The vector has other genetic elements within it that allow it to be regulated 
and detected.  The particles that are coated with the DNA carrying the coat protein are 
injected into cultured cells using the gene gun device.  The cells that received the new 
DNA in the correct compartment of the cell (the nucleus), are selected using detection 
12 
techniques based on “markers” coded for by the vector.  These cells are then cultured 
and nursed back to full plants using tissue culture techniques. 
 Alternatively, foreign DNA can be transferred into plants using Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens, a bacterium that has a natural ability to transfer pieces of its genome into 
plants.  In nature, this is a strategy the bacterium uses to transfer genes that code for 
the production of novel amino acids that the bacterium uses for sustenance.  In the 
laboratory, scientists have hijacked this system to insert genes of choice into the plant.  
Both of these gene transfer techniques are now routinely and widely used in 
transforming papaya and other plant species.   
 
C.  Tissue Culture of Papaya 
 Both DNA transfer techniques require that the plant be able to be regenerated 
from the transformed cells using tissue culture.  When the Gonsalves group began 
their work on papaya, they had to develop a protocol for regenerating papaya plants 
from papaya embryos in culture [3].  This work was primarily done by Maureen Fitch, 
then a PhD student working under the supervision of Richard Manshardt, but also an 
employee of the Hawaii Sugar Planters’ Association research laboratory in Hawaii.  
After developing the initial protocols, other researchers in the Gonsalves lab and 
elsewhere were able to successfully regenerate papaya from somatic embryos and later 
on by more efficient means. 
 After a transformed plant carrying the coat protein construct was developed, it 
could be bred by traditional means into other desirable varieties.  Richard Manshardt 
was responsible for doing much of the breeding in the Hawaii case. Once the initial 
transgenic plant is deregulated, it can be crossed with non-transgenic varieties and the 
resulting cultivars are not subject to further deregulation since they do not contain any 
novel regulated components. 
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D.  Papaya Ringspot Virus 
 PRSV is the major limiting factor for papaya production in most areas where 
papaya is grown.  PRSV is of the poty virus type (family Potyviridae) and is 
transmitted non-persistently by aphids.  The virus can be transferred from tree to tree 
in a matter of seconds when aphids probe the fruit in search of a suitable host.  Aphids 
do not prefer the papaya, which worsens the situation since they continue probing 
subsequent fruits on adjacent trees.  PRSV diminishes the photosynthetic abilities of 
the upper leaves of the papaya tree leading to reductions in vegetative vigor, fruit 
quality and yields.  Ultimately the disease culminates in the death of the plant [4]. 
 
II.  Developing Farmer-Ready GM papaya 
A.  The Situational Case in Hawaii. 
 The situational case of developing and introducing GE PRSV-resistant papaya 
for Hawaii is novel and of particular relevance to this study.  This publicly funded 
project was completed by university researchers with the goal of helping the farmers 
of Hawaii, without direct support from seed companies or with any goals of financial 
gain.  Through the dedication of university researchers, the GE papaya is attributed 
with saving the Hawaiian papaya industry. 
 
1. Background 
 In 1978 Cornell University-based researcher Dennis Gonsalves met with the 
Dean of Agriculture at the University of Hawaii who expressed concern regarding the 
threat posed by PRSV found in the back yards of Hilo, Hawaii.  The virus had 
decimated the papaya industry on the island of Oahu a decade or two earlier and now 
was threatening Hawaii’s major papaya production region in the Puna district of the 
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big island of Hawaii where 95% of the state’s crop is grown.  Papaya is second only to 
pineapple in agronomic importance for Hawaii, and was under serious threat by the 
virus.  The Dean asked Gonsalves for help, and with initial funding of about $5000, he 
returned to his laboratory in Geneva, New York, to tackle the problem. 
 The story of the subsequent decades of research to find a solution for Hawaii’s 
papaya farmers involved the then-novel use of cross protection using a mild strain of 
the virus, which was met with limited success.  However, it caught the attention of 
researchers in developing countries such as Thailand, who were struggling with their 
own versions of the virus.  It was at that time that Vilai Prasartsee, of the Northeast 
Regional Office of Agriculture, Tha Pra, in the northeast region of Thailand contacted 
Gonsalves for help controlling the virus in Thailand. 
 Frustrated by the limited success of using cross protection, and with no known 
resistance genes in Carica papaya, Gonsalves turned towards the novel tools of 
genetic engineering.  From the cross-protection work, the PRSV coat protein was 
already well characterized. John Sanford, also at the Cornell campus in Geneva, had 
just developed the so-called “gene gun,” allowing biolistic transformation, and 
collaborators in Hawaii were working out tissue culture techniques to regenerate 
papaya from embryogenic cultures.  With all of the major scientific hurdles in place, 
the team moved quickly to develop the first transgenic line in 1991.  This line was 
called 55-1 and was a transformed red-fleshed Sunset cultivar.  Although yellow-
fleshed, “Kapoho” variety is the preferred and dominant variety in Puna, it was 
recalcitrant to transformation.  To overcome this hurdle, the transgenic 55-1 line 
(SunUp) was crossed with non-transgenic Kapoho using traditional breeding, and the 
resulting F1 was named “Rainbow.”  Rainbow is a yellow-fleshed papaya hemizygous 
for the coat protein gene to ensure virus resistance.  This variety shows hybrid vigor, 
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produces fruit earlier than either parent and showed 25-fold higher production than 
non-transgenic papaya in the presence of the virus [5]. 
   In 1992, PRSV was first identified in commercial papaya in Puna and by 1995 
it was widespread, devastating Puna’s papaya industry. Between 1992 and 1997 
production fell by 20 million pounds.   Due to limited supply, the price for fresh 
papaya rose from 25 cents per pound in 1992 to 52.9 cents per pound in 1997 [6].   
 As the disease continued to spread throughout Puna in 1995, the research team 
was ready to conduct its first large-scale field trial of Rainbow and SunUp.  The field 
trial included replicated areas of Rainbow, SunUp, non-transgenic Sunset, and an 
additional transgenic Sunset line, 63-1.  In addition there was a larger area designated 
as Rainbow surrounded by non-transgenic Sunset.  All non-transgenic papaya became 
infected within 11 months of starting the field trial while none of the transgenic test 
plants became infected during the three years the plants were in the field [6]. The team 
concluded the first field trials confirming that their original transgenic line was 
resistant to PRSV.   
 In late 1995 the deregulation process was initiated and three years later, the 
Hawaii Papaya Administrative Committee (PAC) obtained the licenses to 
commercialize transgenic papaya in Hawaii. Two years after filing applications, the 
new GE crop was deregulated by the US regulatory agencies: the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA).    
 On May 1st, 1998, coincident with International Worker’s Day, transgenic, 
PRSV-resistant Rainbow seeds were distributed free to Hawaiian farmers.  The Papaya 
Administrative Committee (PAC) is a federal marketing order that was granted the 
technology licenses and made the seeds available to farmers, provided they watch an 
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educational video about GE papayas and sign a sublicensing form.  Papaya seeds were 
only distributed for use in Hawaii and could not be brought to other states or countries.  
In addition, due to limited number of seeds, they were distributed equably, giving 
priority to farmers who were “currently and historically” most affected by PRSV [7] 
and other set standards.   
 
2.  Farmer Adoption 
 The farmers largely embraced the technology, which enabled them to resume 
papaya farming after six years of anxiety and crop failure.  A farmer adoption study 
was carried out by Carol Gonsalves [7] in which she surveyed 54 % of the 171 
registered commercial growers in the Puna area of Hawaii who had filed a request for 
Rainbow seeds when they became available. Farmers in Hawaii are considered 
“commercial” only if they have at least 5 acres. According to Hawaii collaborator, 
Steve Ferreira, few farmers plant over 20-50 acres [8].  In this study, farmers were 
classified as adopters of the transgenic seed if they had planted Rainbow seeds 
between May 1st when they were released and the end of the survey period in 
September 1999.  The adoption rate reported in the study was 76%, which the authors 
considered “astounding.”  Of the 93 respondents, 92 had prepared to receive seeds by 
attending a mandatory educational session.  Ninety-one percent of the farmers 
surveyed in Puna were of Pilipino heritage.  Farmers who obtained seeds, but had not 
yet planted them attributed it to not having land (33%), not having their land prepared 
(21%), lacked seeds (21%), or didn’t have enough money to plant (17%).  Although 
some respondents were concerned about market approval by Japan and Canada at the 
time of the survey, none of the farmers interviewed expressed personal objection to the 
use of GE plants.  Initially the seeds were free to farmers. Yet, at the time of the 
survey, 86% of farmers said they would be willing to pay for transgenic seeds and 
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77% said that labeling transgenic papaya was important, primarily because they 
believed it would increase the marketability of their fruit.   
 When the aforementioned survey was completed, papaya seeds had been 
available to farmers for 16 months and 19% of farmers were already harvesting 
Rainbow.  In 2000, the Hawaii Agricultural Statistics Service reported that Rainbow 
was the dominant papaya variety in Hawaii, comprising 50% of the acreage [9].  In 
1998, the year that transgenic seed was first available to farmers, the Puna area 
produced 26 million pounds of papaya and in 2002 it increased production to 33 
million pounds [10]. 
 One of the first farmers to adopt and plant Rainbow was third generation 
papaya farmer, Willie Julien, a 50 year-old of Pilipino descent residing in Puna.   He 
was an active member of the PAC when they decided to support the GE papaya 
project.  
 “We knew that we could not control the virus and so it forced us to go ahead 
on the research so we could start planting these new papayas,” said Julien, in a 2005 
interview [11].  “People didn’t believe that cutting down the trees was the only answer 
to the virus, so the disease was spreading rapidly,” Julien continued. 
 “We were kind of scared because it was new and we didn’t know what to 
expect from consumers.  But at the same time we didn’t have enough papayas for the 
market because the disease was so bad, and killing all of the Solo [non-transgenic 
Kapoho] papayas,” Julien explained. 
 “As soon as I saw that these papayas were growing good in the field trials and 
the fruit was nice—looking better than the Solo—in my mind I know that this papaya 
will be good.” 
 When the virus pressure was heavy in the mid 1990’s, Julien and some other 
more fortunate farmers were planting on the other side of the island in Hamakua, 
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where the virus had not yet spread.  However, plants suffered from excessive rainfall 
without the drainage that the newer volcanic soils of Puna provide.  Now, Julien and 
the others have returned to Puna, where he has the largest acreage of papays—200 
acres—which is planted entirely with Rainbow. 
 Julien is assured by the confidence he has in US regulatory agencies.  “If the 
FDA and the EPA approve it, what should I be afraid of?” he questions.  Although he 
recognizes the desire of some farmers to continue planting non-GE papaya to fill 
Japanese markets, he is not among them.  “For me, I know the virus almost shut me 
down.  I’m not going to go back and plant Solo anymore.  It’s too much of a gamble,” 
he said.  Julien states that genetically engineered papaya helped him a lot, helped to 
save the industry, and also slowed down the disease. 
 Another farmer, Orlando Manuel, also grows nearly entirely GE papaya on his 
30 acres, with a few acres of non-GE Solo.  In the business of papaya production since 
he came from the Philippines in 1972, he says that there were roughly 400-500 papaya 
farmers before the onset of the virus.  He says there are far fewer now because many 
of them quit after the virus came—something he says he would have done too, had the 
Rainbow not come along.  He imagines he would likely be working in an agricultural 
products establishment if he were not able to grow PRSV-resistant papaya.  In 1998 he 
went from struggling to grow Kapoho in Hamakua to growing 100% Rainbow back in 
Puna.  “At the beginning,” Manuel reported in a 2005 interview [12], “ there was a 
perception that the Rainbow would give softer fruit or be more susceptible to disease, 
but that was all perceptions.  But there was another fraction of us that wanted to 
embrace the GMO kind.”  He estimates that he was one of approximately 20 growers 
to initially plant Rainbow, with the other growers following suit about a year later. 
 Many stakeholders in Hawaii will readily state that the introduction of 
Rainbow revitalized the industry—saving the economy of Hilo and regions of the big 
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island dependent on papaya production.  The development and wide adoption of the 
GE papaya also allowed farmers to resume growing non-transgenic papaya produced 
primarily for export to Japan, where GE papaya is still regulated2.   
 Plant pathologist Steven Ferreira, a member of the Rainbow team since 1995, 
worries that each year the virus pressure is getting more severe [8].  He reasons that 
the amount of virus present is directly correlated with the amount of susceptible 
papaya on the island.  Currently, the presence of the disease is about 50% of what it 
was before the adoption of Rainbow, which currently comprises about 50% of 
production.  The remaining 50% of papaya is non-GE; primarily the Kapoho variety.  
He reasons that by continuing Kapoho production, the virus is perpetuated.  He would 
like to see a complete eradication of Kapoho for one or two years to wipe out the 
virus.  Then, he reasons, the non-GE papaya could be reintroduced without immediate 
threat by the virus. He says that efforts to get the state of Hawaii to fund such an 
initiative have failed, but could offer a long-term solution to the virus and ultimately 
allow more secure co-existence for farmers who choose to grow non-GE papaya. 
 
B.  The Situational Case in Thailand 
 During the development of GE PRSV-resistant papaya for Hawaii, the 
Gonsalves laboratory became a destination for papaya researchers from all over the 
developing world, including Thailand, Brazil, Bangladesh, and Jamaica.  With each 
papaya-producing country plagued by its own form of the virus, researchers went to 
                                                
2 Although GE papaya is not currently imported by Japan, a petition to deregulate GE 
PRSV-resistant papaya has been submitted and is currently in the late stages of 
review. 
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Gonsalves to isolate their locally relevant coat protein and produce a transgenic 
papaya for their own country’s struggling farmers.  
 The Thai collaborators from the DOA were not far behind the early success in 
Hawaii, with the first transgenic lines ready to return to Thailand in 1997.  Meanwhile, 
independent projects were initiated in Thailand at Kasetsart University and Mahidol 
University. The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications 
(ISAAA) promoted public-private partnerships that offered countries such as the 
Philippines and Thailand, to initiate their own domestic PRSV-resistant papaya 
through similar techniques, but different channels. 
 PRSV has threatened papaya in Northeast Thailand since 1975 and is the most 
limiting factor in papaya production [13].  Efforts to control the disease in Thailand by 
insecticides and attempts to develop naturally resistant varieties have proved 
ineffective.  
  In 1979 Vilai Prasartsee, of the Northeast Regional Office of Agriculture 
(NEROA) under the DOA, initiated efforts to control the virus with an eradication 
program in 1981.  This involved removing virus-infected trees to minimize re-
infection and the spread of the virus.   It seemed a viable solution, since trees are not 
grown in large commercial plots, but rather in isolated backyards, separated by rice 
paddies and other geographic barriers.  But the reluctance of villagers to cut down 
infected trees that were already bearing fruit, undermined the success of this program. 
 In 1986 Vilai Prasartsee contacted Dennis Gonsalves, who was experimenting 
with cross protection to control the virus.  Using funds from USAID and the Thai 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), the team had limited success with 
the unsustainable cross protection strategy and subsequently moved on to try to breed 
a tolerant variety by crossing the “Florida tolerant” variety with those preferred 
locally.  By 1994, the team had developed three lines of PRSV-tolerant hybrids: 
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Thapra 1, 2, and 3.  Until 2004 Thapra 2 was the primary variety being distributed to 
people in the northeast and other regions of Thailand.  At the present time, no papaya 
seeds are distributed to farmers by NEROA, due to as of yet unsubstantiated 
accusations that the station allowed GE seeds to escape the confines of the station 
(Prasartsee, 2005).  
 By 1994, significant progress was being made by the Gonsalves group in 
developing a GE, PRSV-resistant papaya for Hawaiian farmers.  Encouraged by the 
new technology, a similar program to control PRSV using genetic engineering was 
initiated by a collaboration between the Thai Department of Agriculture (DOA) and 
Cornell University and was partially funded by the Thai government.  
 In 1995, two scientists from Thailand went to the Gonsalves laboratory to 
develop GE, PRSV-resistant lines for Thailand. Two local Thai cultivars were 
transformed using microprojectile bombardment.  The construct contained a non-
translatable coat protein gene of PRSV that was isolated from a virus strain that occurs 
in the Khon Kaen area of NE Thailand.  It is important to point out that the strategy 
used here involved inserting a sequence in the vector that renders the coat protein gene 
non-translatable.  In other words, although the DNA is transcribed from DNA to RNA, 
no coat protein is actually made.  Thus, there are no detectable amounts of foreign 
virus protein in the resulting transformed papaya. 
 In 1997, the research team returned to Thailand with two transformed varieties, 
Khakdam and Khaknuan, which were transferred to the research station at Tha Pra, 
Khon Kaen province for further breeding and analysis in the confines of a greenhouse.  
Field trials began at the station in 1999 and continued until 2004.  Selected third 
generation lines from both transformed varieties showed 97%- 100% resistance to the 
virus. However, progress was brought to a standstill in August of 2004 when 
Greenpeace staged a protest at the research station (discussed below).  At the present 
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time, no genetically modified papaya is grown in the field in Thailand by farmers or 
by researchers.  Papaya production in Thailand remains in crisis and many subsistence 
farmers lack access to this nutritionally important cultural food staple. 
 
III.  The Papaya Biotechnology Network of Southeast Asia 
 Although this case study is largely based on the Cornell/UH case in Hawaii 
and the Cornell/ DOA case in Thailand, it is important to note that other independent 
projects were initiated to address the PRSV epidemic in Thailand.  Prominent among 
these projects, is that of the Papaya Biotechnology Network (PBN) of Southeast Asia.   
 Established in 1998 by ISAAA, the network includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam as its member countries [14].  Significant in-
country support for research activities is provided by institutions of member countries.  
In the case of Thailand, support is provided by the National Center for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology [15] and the Plant Genetic Engineering Unit (PGEU) 
at Kasetsart University.   
 The network is a model for the development of North-South and South-South 
collaborations that benefits from cooperation between public-private collaborations to 
promote the donation, transfer, and sharing of intellectual property [14].  Such 
collaborations promote regional cooperation and facilitate the development of 
improved crops while minimizing the need for technological infrastructure, financial 
resources and technical expertise.  Monetary and technological support for PBN’s 
projects was provided by The Rockefeller Foundation, East-West Seed Company, 
Monsanto, Syngenta, University of Hawaii, Cornell University, University of 
Nottingham, the Monsanto Fund, ISAAA, the USDA and the U.S. FDA [14], in 
addition to country-specific internal support. 
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 Development of a PRSV-resistant papaya was completed in a manner similar 
to the Cornell/DOA project, using coat protein mediated resistance/ gene silencing as a 
mechanism to control the virus.  A field trial was ongoing at Kasetsart University until 
2004 when the moratorium on field testing of GE crops was put in place in Thailand.  
The network continues to strengthen the technological capacity of Thailand and 
facilitate technology transfer to member countries. 
 
IV.  Technology Transfer:  The US/ Thailand, Cornell/DOA Case 
 Much of the controversy spurred in Thailand regarding the GE papaya stems 
from misconceptions over patents and intellectual property.  In this section a 
description of the technologies used to create GE, PRSV-resistant papaya will be 
examined as well as the licensing agreements, that enabled their use. 
 Figure 1, in the Appendix, depicts the construct used to transform the Thai 
cultivars of papaya to render them resistant to PRSV.  Several of the components of 
the construct are of little significance to the larger matter at hand, but did require 
special licensing in order to be used for commercializing papaya for Thai farmers.   
The use of many of the components owned by entities other than Cornell University 
were negotiated for use in Hawaii with the potential technology transfer to developing 
countries already in mind.  Table 1 lists patented technologies that were likely used in 
the PRSV-resistant papaya project for Thailand. 
 In the Thai media, Cornell University’s office of technology transfer, the 
Cornell Research Foundation (CRF), has come under scrutiny.  Greenpeace 
spokespeople have referred to the Cornell Research Foundation as a “multinational 
company.”  In another instance, it was reported that the Cornell/DOA research team 
conducted its work without a legal agreement over who would benefit from the 
outcome of the study; citing that, in spite of this, CRF was in the process of patenting 
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two technologies related to the research. In an editorial directed toward farmers and 
stakeholders in agribusiness and published in BusinessWorld, the author stated, “It 
seems even prestigious universities are beginning to take the cudgels of GMO 
multinationals which may be funding the research programs” [16].  Another article 
made the oversimplified statement that “the GM papaya was developed by Monsanto, 
a food biotechnology company.” [17] disregarding the fact that there have been three 
papaya projects in Thailand, only one of which is directly involved with Monsanto. 
  
Table 1.  A sample of patented technologies that were likely used in producing PRSV-
resistant papaya for Thailand. 
 
Technology Purpose Patent Holder 
Pathogen derived 
resistance (PDR) 
Conceptual method of achieving 
resistance 
Monsanto Company 
Coat Protein Gene 
specific for Thailand 
project 
Viral component that confers PDR Cornell Research 
Foundation & Upjohn 
Company 
Potyvirus coat protein 
genes and plants 
transformed within 
Concept of transforming plants with 
potyvirus coat proteins to confer 
resistance. 
Cornell Research 
Foundation & Upjohn 
Company 
CaMV 35S promoter 
and terminator 
Controls the expression of the coat 
protein gene and the GUS gene 
Monsanto Company 
GUS gene Allow detection of transformed plants CAMBIA 
NPTII gene Allows selection of transformed plants in 
tissue culture 
Monsanto Company 
Biolistic 
transformation 
Transformation method Cornell Research 
Foundation with exclusive 
licensing to Dupont 
Nontranslatable virus 
resistance 
Concept of preventing translation of RNA 
to protein 
Oregon State University 
Papaya germplasm Plant material transformed Public domain 
  
 Richard Cahoon, Acting Executive Director at the Cornell Research 
Foundation, outlined his involvement with the licensing of PRS-resistant papaya for 
Thailand and other countries that collaborated with the Gonsalves research team in a 
concise article [18].  Beyond the case in Hawaii, which instigated the work, Thailand, 
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Mexico, Brazil, Jamaica, Venezuela, and Bangladesh were also involved in the PRSV-
resistant work.  Each of these countries forged collaborations with Gonsalves, and 
each sent researchers to work in the Gonsalves lab.   
 The first step in licensing the transgenic papaya was to obtain the freedom to 
operate (FTO), based on patent law.  According to Cahoon this refers to the fact that 
intellectual property (IP) can hinder the legal freedom to use a technology that has 
been created.  As explained by Cahoon, a patent is a negative right and only grants the 
patent owner the right to stop others from using or making the patented subject. It does 
not enable the patent owner to use the patented subject.  If there are other patents, 
which control even one component of the process to exercise the patented subject, the 
creator can not practice their own technology [19]. 
 Because many of the DNA sequences within the vectors and molecular 
methods used in creating GE papaya were developed by entities other than Cornell 
(Table 1), Cahoon and Gonsalves first had to obtain the FTO.  The Cornell Research 
Foundation had to negotiate the license to use components such as those listed in Table 
1.  The FTO analysis conducted by Cornell’s IP/ technology transfer office revealed a 
total of fifteen distinct patented technologies and a few that were in the public domain.  
Three of the fifteen patents were held by CRF and two were in the public domain.  
The remaining ten technologies were covered by third parties and required 
simultaneous and multi-party negotiations with other universities, non-profit 
organizations and for-profit corporations.  In some cases, FTO licenses were obtained 
by paying licensing fees upfront, while in other cases technologies were acquired by 
exchanging other technologies patented by Cornell with third parties.   
 Gonsalves and Cahoon foresaw the problem that agencies such as the Hawaii 
Papaya Administrative Committee and other entities in collaborating developing 
countries would not necessarily have the resources, political leverage, or knowledge to 
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obtain licenses on their own.  The CRF took the lead in acquiring the FTO, which it 
could transfer to each of these entities.  Licenses were subsequently transferred for use 
in Hawaii to the PAC, for example, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was 
drawn up with the DOA in Thailand, in preparation for transferring the license to that 
country. 
 A key point in the FTO negotiations was distinguishing commercial use of the 
technologies versus humanitarian use.  Commercial use requires payment of royalties, 
whereas humanitarian use does not.  According to the agreement, small-scale farmers 
producing fruit from a small number of trees does not constitute commercial use.  The 
exact definition of commercial use is to be defined by the DOA in Thailand and should 
include any fruit which is exported [19]. 
 
V.  Regulatory Evaluation of GE PRSV-Resistant Papaya 
 
A.  The US regulatory framework 
 In the Unites States the regulation of biotechnology-based products is overseen 
by three federal agencies:  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
operated by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the United States Department of Health 
and Human Service’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  This tri-agency system 
for the regulation of biotechnology products was drawn up under the 1986 
Coordinated Framework [20].   
 
1.  APHIS 
 The mission of APHIS is to protect American agricultural resources from 
invasive pests and diseases, to resolve and manage agricultural pests and diseases and 
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to ensure the humane treatment of animals.  APHIS regulations in Section 7 CFR 344, 
grant APHIS the authority, under the Federal Plant Pest Act and the Plant Quarantine 
Act to “regulate the import, handling, interstate movement, and release into the 
environment, of certain genetically engineered organisms and products, including 
organisms undergoing confined experimental use for field trials [20].  Under APHIS 
guidelines, a genetically engineered organism is considered a regulated subject if the 
organism, recipient organism, vector, or vector agent used in engineering the organism 
belongs to one of the taxa listed in the regulation and is also a plant pest or if there is 
reason to believe it is a plant pest [20].  Inventors of GE products can petition APHIS 
for a determination of non-regulated status of a product.  Once de-regulated, these 
developments are no longer subject to regulation by APHIS and can be used in food, 
animal feed, and in breeding programs the same way as conventional products. 
 APHIS authorized the Gonsalves’ collaborators at the University of Hawaii to 
conduct field trials of two lines of GE PRSV-resistant lines of “SunUp” papaya from 
1991 to 1996 [20].  In 1996 the UH-Cornell team petitioned APHIS to make the 
determination that these lines no longer be considered regulated articles under the 
APHIS regulations. 
 According to APHIS, a determination that an organism does not present a plant 
pest risk can be made when there is evidence that the plant under consideration: 
1) Exhibits no plant pathogenic properties; 2) Should not increase the likelihood of the 
emergence of new plant viruses; 3) is no more likely to become a weed that a virus-
resistant plant developed by traditional breeding techniques; 4) is unlikely to increase 
the weediness potential for any other cultivated plant or native wild species with 
which the organisms can inter-breed; 5) is unlikely to harm other organisms, such as 
bees, which are beneficial to agriculture and 6) should not cause damage to processed 
agricultural commodities.  In addition, the UH-Cornell petitioners requested a 
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determination regarding the regulated status of any future papaya lines that are a result 
of crossing with the two transgenic lines being evaluated [21].  
  In their evaluation of the scientific literature and the data submitted by the 
petitioners at UH and Cornell in 1996, APHIS identified no significant impact to the 
environment and determined that the two transgenic lines would no longer be 
considered regulated articles.  Specifically, APHIS made the following conclusions: 
 1.  The transgenic “SunUp” papaya lines exhibit no plant pathogenic 
properties, even though the PRSV-itself a plant pathogen- was used in developing the 
transgenic papaya lines.  These papaya plants are not infected with PRSV and can not 
incite the disease in other plants.  According to the Environmental Assessment (EA), 
“Although some DNA sequences used in the transformation process were derived 
from bacterial and viral plant pathogens, these genes do not cause disease in the 
papaya plant.  Once inserted into the genome of the papaya plant, the introduced 
sequences are maintained and transmitted in the same manner as any other DNA 
sequences within the plant.”  They add, “Expression of the PRSV coat protein gene in 
the papaya does not cause plant disease, but rather confers resistance to infection by 
PRSV,” [22]. 
 2.  Cultivation of these transgenic papaya lines will not increase the likelihood 
of the emergence of new plant viruses.  The unconfined cultivation of these transgenic 
viruses would be no different than non-transgenic PRSV-infected lines.  As stated in 
the EA, “APHIS concludes that it is unlikely that new viruses will arise as a 
consequence of the widespread cultivation of lines 55-1 and 63-1, because no other 
virus infects papayas in the United States,” [22].  
 3.  The transgenic lines are no more likely to become weeds than any other 
types of papaya.  Papaya is not a weed pest in North America or Hawaii and there is 
no reason to believe that resistance to PRSV will lead them to becoming weeds. 
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 4.  The transgenic papaya lines will not increase the weediness potential of any 
other cultivated or native, wild species with which they can inter-breed.  No other 
species in this genus (Carica) is considered a weed. 
 5.  The transgenic lines will not harm or threatened endangered species or 
other beneficial organisms such as bees.  APHIS states, “The coat protein in papaya is 
not known to have any toxic properties.  In fact, this viral coat protein is routinely 
ingested by virtually all animals including humans, when papaya is consumed.  
Naturally occurring infections of susceptible papaya varieties result in concentrations 
of coat proteins far higher than those in the tissues of the transgenic lines,” [22]. 
 6.  The transgenic lines will not cause damage to processed agricultural 
commodities. 
 7.  APHIS concluded that any new papaya varieties bred from the transgenic 
lines evaluated should not exhibit new plant pest properties and are also released from 
regulatory oversight by APHIS. 
 
2.  EPA 
 In some genetically engineered crops the introduced trait is considered a “plant 
pesticide.”  This includes insecticidal proteins such as toxins derived from the 
bacterium, Bacilllus thuringensis, and viral coat proteins that confer PDR.  The safety 
of these transgenes is under regulation by the EPA. The EPA’s mandate is to “protect 
human health and the environment by ensuring that a pesticide derived from 
biotechnology produces no unreasonable adverse effects.” [23].  The EPA has 
established regulatory programs for products of biotechnology that are used as 
pesticides.  Plant Incorporated Protectants (PIPs) are pesticidal substances expressed 
and produced by plants [23].  Both the protective protein the plant expresses and the 
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genetic material that codes for the protein are regulated by the EPA, whereas the plant 
itself is regulated by the USDA [23].   
 For GE pesticides, the EPA examines the following information in determining 
PIP safety: 
1) Identification of new genetic material and all new proteins; 
2) Mammalian toxicity testing of all new proteins; 
3) Comparison of new proteins to known toxins and allergens; 
4) Toxicity testing on birds, fish, earthworms, and representative insects such as 
bees; 
5) Toxicity testing on insects related to target insect pests; 
6) The length of time required for the new proteins to degrade in the environment 
[23]. 
 The EPA published its proposed rule for plant pesticides including an 
exemption for the viral coat protein in plants in 1997. 
 
3. Food Safety and the FDA 
 The genetic modification of food crops can not only prove beneficial to the 
farmer in terms of limiting labor and pesticide/herbicide input, but also offers 
consumer benefits.  Genetic engineering can be used to lower the concentrations of 
known allergens in food (imagine a hypoallergenic peanut) or to increase the 
production of beneficial vitamins and nutrients (in the case of vitamin A enhanced 
rice, for example) [24].   
 Safety assessment of genetically engineered food crops is based on the concept 
of substantial equivalence, developed by the OECD in 1993 and elaborated upon by 
the FAO/WHO in 2000 [25].  Substantial equivalence bases assessment of foods 
derived from GE on a comparison with existing, non-GE foods, which serve as a 
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reference point.  The current food supply, which predates genetic engineering, is 
considered to be safe as proven by a long history of consumption, even though 
traditional foods have not gone under the careful scrutiny and deregulation procedures 
that genetically engineered foods now experience.  Employing substantial equivalence 
does not assess the safety of foods, but rather identifies any potential differences 
between traditional foods and those modified through GE [25].  If differences are 
identified, the new food product is further assessed for food safety. 
 In the United States, the FDA is responsible for ensuring food safety and 
proper labeling of all foods and food substances, except for meat and poultry, which 
are overseen by the USDA. Thus the FDA has oversight on all fruits and vegetables 
and their derived products [26].  The FDA published a policy statement in 1992 
describing how foods developed through bioengineering should be regulated.  The 
FDA requires that all foods developed through genetic modification meet the same 
safety standards as other foods on the market today. 
 In their evaluation of GE foods, the agency assesses the intended and 
unintended changes to the crop being evaluated as well as information about the 
desired trait that is inserted into the plant and whether unintended changes in the 
plant’s pathways have been affected [26].  In addition, the agency looks at whether the 
changes in the plant produce toxins or are considered allergens.   
 In January of 1997, the Gonsalves team submitted a safety and nutritional 
assessment of the transgenic PRSV-resistant papaya in which the developers 
concluded that their product is not materially different, in terms of food safety and 
nutritional profile, from red-pigmented papaya varieties with an established history of 
safe use [27].  Later that year, the FDA determined that the GE papaya was equivalent 
to conventional papaya in terms of nutritional and food safety.  The coat protein was 
found to be an unlikely allergen or toxin from simulated digestion studies.  In addition, 
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it was concluded that non-GE papaya, which is susceptible to the virus, contain higher 
levels of coat protein than the GE papaya.  Before and following this determination, 
there have been no reports of adverse effects linked to the consumption of PRSV-
resistant fruit. 
 In summary, the GE PRSV-resistant papaya line 55-1, which was crossed by 
traditional means to produce “Rainbow” was deregulated in the United States by three 
distinct agencies, which comprise the US regulatory framework: 
• APHIS deregulated the PRSV resistant papaya in November 1996 
• The EPA granted approval in August 1997. 
• The FDA granted approval in September 1997. 
 
B.  The Regulatory Framework in Thailand 
 In recent years, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) recognized that the 
introduction of agricultural biotechnology should be one of the most promising ways 
of increasing the efficiency of agriculture.  In 1983 the RTG set up the National Center 
for Genetic Engineering and Agricultural Biotechnology [15].  Since that time 
BIOTEC, together with the Department of Agriculture and universities, have 
conducted genetic engineering research [28].  
 Although Thailand has general biosafety guidelines in place that are overseen 
by various entrusted agencies, Thailand has not developed a national biosafety law to 
enforce proper biosafety management of genetically engineered crops [28].   
 
1.  The Current Biotechnology Policy 
 Based on the Plant Quarantine Act B.E. 2507 (amended) and an April 2001 
Cabinet decision, Thailand does not allow importation and production of any 
transgenic plants outside basic research in the laboratory (or greenhouse) with 
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exceptions for processed food and imports or sales of soybeans and corn for feed use, 
human consumption and industrial uses [28]. 
 The Ministry of Public Health enacted a labeling law in May of 2003 based on 
five percent tolerance.  Accordingly, any product containing an ingredient that is more 
than five percent of the final product and is produced from a GE plant requires 
labeling [28].  
 In Thailand, the Department of Agriculture is responsible for regulating 
imported GMO seeds for planting and assessing related risks.  The FDA regulates the 
use of GM food and labeling procedures.  The Department of Trade Negotiations and 
Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce regulates the imports of GM 
products used as raw materials.  The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
(MAOC) along with the National Bureau of National Agricultural Commodity and 
Food Standards (ACFS) is responsible for representing the RTG in international 
organizations such as CODEX. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment is 
responsible for drafting the National Biosafety Law since 2003, and is the national 
agency that determines biological diversity policy [28]. 
 In March of 2003, the Thai Cabinet set up the National Biotechnology Policy 
Committee (NBPC) chaired by the Prime Minister and assigned the National Science 
Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) as the Committee’s secretariat.  In 
December of 2003, the NBPC approved the National Biosafety Policy Framework 
[15] which was proposed by the NSTDA [28]. 
 In brief, the framework encourages the development of biotech related research 
and development, to use biotechnology to increase production of major crops, to 
increase the health of the Thai people, to use biotechnology to conserve the 
environment and help rural economies attain self sufficiency, and to develop a skilled 
labor force in biotechnology [15]. 
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2.  Safety Assessment of the GE Papaya in Thailand 
 In assessing the safety of the GE papaya in Thailand, that country will benefit 
from the precedence in Hawaii where GE papaya has been grown and consumed for 
approximately ten years.   In the DOA case, the GE PRSV-resistant papaya was 
created using the same vectors that were used for the Hawaiian papaya except that the 
coat protein was isolated from a PRSV isolate from Thailand.  GE papaya has been 
fully deregulated in the US by federal agencies, and commercialized in the US since 
1998.   No harmful effects on humans or the environment have been observed. 
 With regards to the DOA GE PRSV-resistant papaya project, safety 
assessments of the Thai GE papaya have been carried out since 1999.  Based on the 
framework in place at that date, transgenic products were subject to various 
governmental agencies including the MOAC, the NBC and the FDA [13].  Below is a 
review of the safety assessments performed between 1999 and 2004. 
 
a.  Environmental Safety 
 Between 2001 and 2004 six sets of experiments were conducted to determine 
any possible ecological effects of GE papaya such as effects on microbial flora, 
beneficial insects, other non-GE papaya and the surrounding soil. 
 1.  From these studies it was shown that that the probability of finding the coat 
protein in non-GE papaya trees due to cross pollination at a distance of 2 meters was 
approximately 20%.  However, it was also reported that the fruits of 99.3% of female 
trees at a distance of 10-25 meters from the plots do not produce seeds and none of the 
seeds produced contained the CP.   Thus, it was concluded that the probability of the 
transgene being transferred beyond ten meters was extremely low [29]. 
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 2.  Soil samples taken near the roots of both GE and non-GE papayas were 
analyzed for differences in the microflora (fungi and bacteria) and no differences were 
found [29]. 
 3.  When 2-3 day old larvae of honeybees were fed with pollen from transgenic 
lines, there was no significant difference in time of larvae emergence and no 
abnormalities in the bees were observed.  In addition, no significant difference was 
found in the survival rate and ovipositioning of predatory mites, which feed on papaya 
pest mites when cultivated on GE and non-GE papaya [29]. 
 4.  Six cultivated plant species were replanted in the same soil that was used 
for planting GE papaya and no abnormalities were observed in these crops. 
 
b.  Food Safety Assessment 
Preliminary experiments were performed following food safety guidelines set by the 
NBPC.  The studies concluded: 
 1.  There were no significant nutritional differences in the composition of GE 
and non-GE papayas tested. 
 2.  The gene insert was studied.  The two selected lines were found to contain 
one to three inserts of the gene, which needs to be confirmed.  
 3.  In order to establish that the introduced gene does not produce toxins or 
allergenic proteins, the DOA project used an untranslatable version of the coat protein.  
The DNA is transcribed to RNA, which induces the resistance. No protein is made 
from that RNA, as confirmed by probing with a PRSV antibody. 
 4.  Papaya was reported to contain a natural toxic compound, benzyl 
isothiocyanate (BITC).  The study showed that neither of the transgenic lines produced 
higher amount of BITC than the non-transgenic counterpart. 
36 
 5.  Rat feeding studies were conducted for the two transgenic Thai varieties.  
Over the course of 42 days rats were fed GE and non-GE papaya in ripe or unripe 
form and observed over a 70 day reproduction phase.  When compared to rats fed non-
GE papaya or normal rat food without papaya, it was concluded that the GE papaya 
varieties had no effect on growth rates and litter size of rats [30]. 
 Similar independent experiments were underway at Kasetsart University until 
2004, when the government placed a ban on field tests of GE crops.  Limited 
experiments are still underway in greenhouses. 
 
VI.  Opposition to GE Papaya in Thailand 
 Thailand promised to be a leader in plant biotechnology research when 
BIOTEC was set up as early as 1983.  In addition to research on domestic projects 
during the period from 1994-2000, many permits were granted for field testing 
transgenic plants in Thailand including the Bt cotton, Bt corn, Round-up Ready (RR) 
cotton, RR corn and PRSV-resistant papaya.  However, developing opposition from 
NGOs such as BioThai and Greenpeace has slowed research on agricultural 
biotechnology in Thailand.  Deregulation has stalled and no transgenic crops are 
commercially produced in Thailand [28].  In this section we will examine some of the 
activities and arguments put forth by NGOs that have thwarted the development of GE 
papaya and other transgenic crops in Thailand. 
 Greenpeace International, based in the Netherlands and arguably one of the 
most powerful environmental groups worldwide, opposes genetic engineering. 
Greenpeace states, “While scientific progress on molecular biology has a great 
potential to increase our understanding of nature and provide medical tools, it should 
not be used as a justification to turn the environment into a giant genetic experiment 
by commercial interests” [31].   
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 The international organization encourages visitors to their website to say no to 
genetic engineering based on the following concerns: 1) GMOs should not be released 
into the environment due to a lack of scientific understanding of their impact on the 
environment and human health; 2) In the immediate term, they advocate labeling of 
GE ingredients and the segregation of GE crops from conventionally grown crops; 3) 
They oppose all patents on plants, animals and human, as well as patents on their 
genes [31]. 
 Greenpeace also has concerns that GE enables genetic manipulation in a way 
that is not “natural”, that it leads to contamination of non-GE crops and plants in the 
environment, that it threatens biodiversity and perhaps most importantly to the group, 
serves commercial interests [31].   
 Around the same time that GE papaya was brought back to Thailand for further 
work at the DOA research station, Greenpeace set up a Southeast Asia office in 
Bangkok to address the environmental concerns of that region.  Their first campaigns, 
according to campaigner Patawjee Srisuwan [32], regarded toxicity and stopping GE.  
 Since research on GE papaya achieved successes in field trials during the first 
few years of this decade, Greenpeace has actively fought the introduction of GE 
papaya.  According to a Greenpeace report [33], genetic engineering is “crude and old 
fashioned” technology and no one really knows how GE papaya is resistant to PRSV.  
They add that the primary environmental risks include the uncertainty of how GE 
papaya will interact with other organisms in the environment and the possibility that 
new strains of viruses may evolve due to the presence of GE Papaya. The report also 
states that the genetic insert in GE papaya is always producing protein in every cell of 
the papaya.  The report states that contamination of non-GE papaya is inevitable, 
citing that research in Hawaii showed 43% contamination of neighboring female 
papaya plants within 25 meters of a GE papaya field.  In addition, they raise concerns 
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about allergenicity of the coat protein and use of antibiotic resistance marker genes 
[33]. 
 BioThai, a Bangkok-based NGO that has preserving biodiversity as its 
mandate, has similar concerns as Greenpeace and the two groups are part of a 
collaborative network that works together with other NGOs on projects where they 
share the same ideology.  They have published their demands on “behalf of the Asian 
people” in a document available on the world wide web (WWW).  In summary, they 
ask that the US government, embassies, and biotech corporations stop intervening into 
the functions of Asian governments, that Asian governments re-orient their policies 
and focus them on alternative agricultural practices, stop all field trials, require 
labeling laws and oppose infringement on biodiversity and the patenting of life forms 
[34].  With little variation in their agendas, most other groups that oppose GE echo 
these claims and will not be detailed here, as Greenpeace SE Asia and BioThai 
represent two of the most prominent opposition groups in Thailand. 
 The opposition to GE in general, as well as in the case of the papaya, heated up 
in 2003, with Greenpeace’s campaign against GE in full swing.  In July of 2003 
Greenpeace recognized the Thai government’s plans to commercialize GE papaya, 
despite the “fact that GE papaya has already been a failure in Hawaii” [35].  
Greenpeace invited Hawaii-based organic farmers Melanie Bondera and John Biloon 
to Thailand to meet with farmers and warn them against growing GE papaya in 
Thailand.  Bondera warned Thai farmers that GE papaya has been a failure in Hawaii, 
causing Hawaiian papaya farmers to lose market share abroad, and warned of 
widespread cross pollination on the big island of Hawaii [36].  
 Perhaps the most significant victory for the oppositional groups was on July 
27th, 2004 when Greenpeace entered the experimental GE papaya field trials and held 
an “activity.”  Dressed in personal protection suits, they began removing GE papaya 
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fruit from trees and disposing them into hazardous material containers.  Having alerted 
the Thai media in advance of the activity, the event was well covered in the Thai and 
international press.  The activity set off a fury of investigations following 
Greenpeace’s charges that GE papaya had escaped from the confines of the field trial 
and were found in the fields of 24 farmers in 35 provinces of Thailand [32, 37].   
 Greenpeace campaigner Varoonvarn Svangsopakul stated that “This is 
potentially one of the worst cases of genetic contamination of a major food crop in 
Asia, as this station is one of the largest suppliers of papaya seeds in the country.”  
“This is the hard evidence that we needed to prove that GE contamination has broken 
into Thailand,” [38] he stated in reference to a bag of allegedly contaminated seeds 
previously purchased by Greenpeace GE campaigner Patwajee Srisuwan months 
earlier.  The seeds were sent to Genescan which has testing facilities in Freiburg, 
Germany and Hong Kong for analysis by PCR3, a method that detects the nptII 
antibiotic resistance gene or the 35S promoter, both components of the vector used to 
transform papaya [39].  Dr. Vilai Prasartsee, the researcher in charge of the DOA field 
trials argues that the sample submitted to Genescan was many grams in excess of what 
is sold at the research station and is suspicious of the true origin of the seeds [40].   
 Shortly after the activity, The DOA charged Greenpeace with trespassing, theft, 
and destruction of property, bringing the matter to Thailand’s courts.  In the meantime, 
it is unclear how the seeds found growing in farmer’s fields were taken out of the 
DOA experimental station.  It does, however concern researcher Vilai Prasartsee, who 
assured the Bangkok Post following the event that researchers had not let the seeds 
leave the station.  “At the DOA we have spent more than 20 years developing high-
                                                
3 PCR, or polymerase chain reaction, is a technique employed to detect specific DNA 
sequences in a biological sample.  
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quality plant varieties for farmers.  We will not endanger their livelihoods by 
distributing GM seeds, which are still being assessed for their safety,” Prasartsee said, 
noting that disseminating GE seeds is in violation of the plant quarantine law [41]. 
 The July 2004 activity and the press it provoked marked a huge success for 
Greenpeace.  Following their activity, the Prime Minister announced that all field trials 
of GE crops were to be stopped and destroyed.  Since then, a moratorium on field 
trials in Thailand remains in place, bringing research on GE papaya to a standstill. 
 At the time of the 2004 activity, the Cornell Research Foundation and the 
Ministry of Agriculture were in the midst of drafting and agreeing upon a MOU 
between Thailand and Cornell as to how to share the benefits from their research 
collaboration in developing a GE papaya for Thailand.  The MOU remains unsigned 
by the Thai officials and negotiations have not resumed [19]. 
 At the center of controversy surrounding genetic engineering in Thailand is the 
case of the papaya.  At the heart of the conflict lie great differences in information 
presented by scientists and GE opposition groups.  Information put forth by scientists 
is refuted by environmentalists, who feel that the technology is inherently unnatural 
and unethical.  Scientists’ voices are overpowered by the media, who are quick to 
cover the colorful agenda of Greenpeace and other groups.   
 Greenpeace Co-founder Patrick Moore has, in recent years, distanced himself 
from Greenpeace and formed Greenspirit, an entity that does not oppose GE but rather 
focuses on sustainable development within the context of environmentalism.  In his 
contribution to the recent book, Let Them Eat Precaution (2006), he calls for a release 
from “Greenpeace’s grip on the media.”  Moore criticizes Greenpeace for their “junk 
science” and zero- tolerance policy on GE, and refutes the allegations of Greenpeace 
point by point [42].  He summarizes his intolerance with the extremist anti-GE 
environmentalists by stating, “Surely there is some way to break through the 
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misinformation and hysteria and get a more balanced picture to the public.  Surely if 
reasonable people who support Greenpeace saw the choice between the risk of a 
daffodil gene in a rice plant versus the certainty of millions of blind children, they 
would descend on the organization’s offices around the world and demand to have 
their money back.  How is it that these charlatans continue to stymie progress on so 
many fronts when their arguments are nothing more than wild, scary speculation?” 
[42]. 
 From a scientific standpoint there are valid concerns regarding the information 
disseminated by some opposition groups regarding GE papaya, a few of which are 
worthy of examination.   
 Often voiced by activists is the concern that the virus, once transgenically 
inserted into the papaya, may mutate and cause other disease problems.  In addition, 
there is concern about the safety of consuming the coat protein.  From a scientific 
standpoint it is important to point out that PRSV-resistant papaya is only very 
infrequently infected by the virus.  The virus itself is not inserted into the papaya, but 
rather the coat protein gene.  What’s more, with the molecular techniques employed 
during the development of the papaya, the GE papaya developed by the DOA/ Cornell 
collaboration does not actually express the coat protein.  Therefore, there is no protein 
produced to cause allergenic or concerns regarding toxicity.  The mechanism by which 
the “immunized” papaya elicits resistance without actually expressing the gene is a 
well-studied and active field of research generally referred to as antisense technology.  
Much is known about the mechanism by which the plant acquires resistance and is not 
considered by the scientific community as “crude science.”   
 Much of the misinformation perpetuated by farmer folklore can be easily 
dismissed based on science-based studies.  Concerns voiced by Thai farmers that GE 
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papaya causes abortion, cancer, and obesity can be easily remedied with effective 
communication campaigns. 
 Environmental concerns should be on the minds of all researchers conducting 
GE research.  Fortunately, there are protocols in place to assure to the greatest degree 
possible that the environment is not compromised.  One of the greatest promises of 
agricultural biotechnology is a reduction in pesticide and herbicide input by farmers.  
PRSV-resistant papaya eliminates the need to spray for aphids—a solution that never 
proved effective.  In addition it eliminates the need for other control measures such as 
netting which require large capitol input for little return.   
 Concerns over antibiotic resistance genes in transformation constructs have 
undergone careful scrutiny by scientific academies and regulatory agencies and are not 
considered a threat to the environment. Gene flow is a fact of nature.  Cross-
pollination does occur, although at a very low rate among hermaphrodite plants, such 
as cultivated papaya.  The acceptance and regulated status of GE papaya as “safe” 
undermines the concerns regarding gene flow.  In Hawaii it is clear that co-existence 
can occur.  Hawaii has in place an efficient and effective system to ensure that farmers 
who export non-GE papaya to Japan, for example, are able to grow uncontaminated 
papaya.  If this can occur in the plantation context of Hawaii, it should be even easier 
to attain co-existence in small kitchen garden farms in Thailand where the distances 
between large stands of papayas are greater. 
 As with all new developments, one must weigh the costs and benefits of the 
technology.  The products have been thoroughly tested with scientific rigor for over 
ten years in the United States and nearly as long in Thailand.  How long is a long-term 
study? What additional tests can be done to assure opposition groups of these 
products’ safety?  These are the ideological question that must be addressed.  In the 
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case of the United States, the federal agencies, which regulate GE crops, have put 
forth answers to such questions. 
 Loss of biodiversity may not be a severe threat in Thailand since Carica 
papaya is not native to Asia.  There are no native species with which the GE papaya 
can interbreed.  Proponents of GE argue that GE papaya could actually increase 
biodiversity by reducing the land cleared for papaya production.  For example, once an 
area is infected with the virus, large-scale growers often move to uninfected areas to 
maintain production, increasing the total land cultivated for papaya production.  If the 
virus no longer pushed farmers to new land, the biodiversity of would-be cultivated 
land may be preserved. 
 Additional concerns have been voiced regarding the utility of PRSV-resistant 
papaya when new virus strains emerge.  This is a valid concern as viruses evolve 
rapidly and may eventually acquire a coat protein gene sequence that is sufficiently 
different from the original sequence used, which would to render the CPMR event 
ineffective.  This potential outcome has not escaped the concerns of Dennis Gonsalves 
and other researchers.  In response, they are currently developing “universally 
resistant” papaya by including sequences from many PRSV coat protein genes to 
reduce the likelihood of pathogens overcoming GE papaya resistance.  Such 
“pyramiding” strategies have been effective in preventing loss of resistance in other 
pest-resistant crops such as those that are resistant to the Bt toxin. 
 Finally, if as has been suggested by many, globalization and corporate control 
of the seed supply is at the heart of the controversy surrounding genetic engineering, 
there is no better case than the papaya.  In both the DOA/ Cornell University case as 
well as the Kasetsart University case, there is no product that has been developed with 
the benefits of the resource-poor farmer more in mind.  In the DOA/Cornell case, the 
papaya was developed with public funds from the US and Thailand with no direct 
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influence or potential gain by big business.  The licenses for the freedom to use the 
technology have been negotiated and cleared by CRF and are being handed over to the 
Thai government with no expectation of return from poor farmers.  In the drafted 
MOU, CRF recommends that the DOA give away or charge subsistence farmers only 
a small token fee for the seed.  Only when growers exceed a production limit to be set 
by the DOA or engage in export is there to be any return on investment to the DOA—a  
small proportion of which should be returned to CRF.    
 Lacking is a dialogue between scientists and activists—a dialogue that may 
never take place due to ideological differences and larger political agendas outside the 
scope of biotechnology that cannot be resolved by science.  As one organic farmer 
from Hawaii stated, she will never support genetic engineering because it is unethical 
[43].  As a Bangkok based activist stated, “I don’t think that Greenpeace will ever be 
okay with GE” [32].  How long will policy makers delay making GE papaya available 
to resource poor farmers if they must first circumvent the ideologies and political 
agendas of activists?  More appropriate is a focus on sound science and the 
establishment of an entrusted regulatory framework within which these agricultural 
products may comply.   
 
VII.  A Future for GE Papaya in Thailand? 
 In January of 2006 a group of Thai farmers growing papaya commercially in 
the central provinces came to see the MOAC asking for help regarding the devastation 
of their papaya by PRSV.  In addition, they pleaded that the government urge DOA 
researchers to continue field trials to assure the biosafety of PRSV-resistant papaya.  
One farmer brought along photographs of his fields which showed 100% loss of his 
papaya crop to PRSV [40]. 
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 Researchers at NEROA recently conducted a survey in the Northeast region of 
Thailand where farmers grow papaya for personal consumption in backyard gardens.  
They found that among the 3091 papaya plants in those villages, 100% were infected 
[40].  As the year progresses the virus is only getting worse.  Many village farmers in 
the northeast are not able to grow papaya due to the wrath of the virus and lack of 
access to seeds since NEROA is no longer able to distribute them to farmers [40]. 
 Much of the progress on developing PRSV-resistant papaya for Thai farmers 
has largely emerged form the vision of a handful of papaya researchers who see their 
job as solving problems in agriculture with viable and sustainable solutions.  It is the 
passion of researchers like Vilai Prasartsee and Dennis Gonsalves and their vision to 
create a healthy papaya for the poor people of Thailand that has driven these efforts.  It 
is now up to the policy makers of Thailand to decide whether the people of Thailand 
will have access to this nutritious and culturally important food or whether 
misinformation and political agendas will outweigh the current needs of the Thai 
people. 
 It is a scientific misfortune that in the eyes of many, all products developed 
with the diverse array of tools in agricultural biotechnology are often judged on the 
same grounds.  Indeed, the agricultural problems, molecular tools, motivations and 
crops involved in each case are dramatically different and warrant individual 
consideration.  The strategy and rationale for developing Round-Up Ready Soybean, 
for example, is entirely different from the rationale and science behind PRSV-resistant 
papaya.  It is important for regulators and policy makers to consider each application 
of agricultural biotechnology on a case-by-case basis.  The GE PRSV-resistant papaya 
should be evaluated on its own merits, weighing the case-specific risks and benefits.  
Not all GE products pose the same degree of ecological, nutritional, economical, or 
ideological risks.  Nor do they all share the same degree of benefit.  It is essential that 
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evaluation be conducted case by case to ensure that the well being of the Thai people 
and the ecology of Thailand be best served. 
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APPENDIX  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Map of transformation vector used to develop a PRSV-resistant papaya for 
Thailand by the Cornell University/ DOA collaboration. 
 
Abbreviations: 
TET, GENT, and NPTII are abbreviations for tetracycline, gentamycin and kanamycin 
resistance genes respectively.  BR and BL stand for right and left border sequences 
which flank a sequence that can be transferred by Agrobacterium tumefaciens when 
that is the mechanism of transformation (in this case the gene gun was used).  GUS is 
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a gene which when expressed can be detected as a blue color by an enzymatic assay.  
It is often used to detect whether or not a papaya plant is transgenic.  CP stands for the 
PRSV coat protein DNA sequence.  35S promoters (35SPRO) drive the expression of 
adjacent downstream genes such as CP in this case.  35S-ter is a sequence that 
indicates the end of transcription, or expression of the preceding gene (the CP gene in 
this case).  The boxed abbreviations as well as HindIII and NcoI indicate restriction 
enzyme cutting sites, or places where the vector can be manipulated in the cloning 
process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FORBIDDEN FRUIT: TRANSGENIC PAPAYA IN THAILAND 
 
For Plant Biologists 
This editorial was part of a three-month special section in the journal Plant 
Physiology.  It comprised one article of the Editor’s Choice Series: The Next 
Generation of Biotech Crops.  It was written for an audience of plant biologists with 
the aim of elaborating on the challenges of taking a product of biotechnology from the 
laboratory bench to the field, using the case of genetically engineered papaya in 
Thailand.  It was published in June 2008.1 
 
 
Dressed in white, hooded “personal protection suits,” Greenpeace activists donned 
goggles, gloves, and respiratory masks—the kind of dress you expect to see in the 
clean zone of a nanotechnology laboratory, not in a field in bucolic Northeast 
Thailand.  Easily bridging a barbed wire fence with a step-ladder, they began pulling 
transgenic papaya (Carica papaya) from the trees, throwing the fruit into biohazard 
waste bins.  The protestors stood for photographs—the press had been alerted—before 
                                                
1 Davidson, S. N. (2008). "Forbidden fruit: Transgenic Papaya in Thailand." Plant 
Physiology 147(2): 487-493. www.plantphysiol.org 
 Copyright American Society of Plant Biologists. 
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a large yellow banner printed both in Thai and English that read:  “Stop GMO Field 
Trials.”   
 It was July 27th 2004; doomsday for agricultural biotechnology in Thailand. 
The protest at the Thai Department of Agriculture’s confined field trial set into motion 
a country-wide moratorium on all field testing of transgenic crops.  Since the 1980’s, 
the country had been a regional leader in developing a competitive biotechnology 
sector. 
 What went wrong?  This is not an exceptional case.  Since 1998, virus-resistant 
papaya had been grown widely in Hawaii, but has failed to be commercialized in 
many other places. This is despite the fact that genetically engineered (GE or GM) 
virus-resistant papaya is close to an ideal “pro-poor” genetically engineered crop. 
 The aim of this essay is to contrast the rapid and widespread adoption of 
transgenic papaya in Hawaii, where it saved an industry, with that of Thailand, where 
it has yet to be approved for commercialization—even though in some regions virus 
infection rates are as high as 100% and yields are dramatically reduced.  
Understanding the political and social factors that stymied this promising technology 
in Thailand may help in devising better strategies for introducing the next generation 
of biotech crops to other countries. 
 
An Unruly Virus 
“What struck me in the beginning was that here was a way that was never before 
possible to combat a disease.”  -Carol Gonsalves, Researcher  
 The papaya ringspot virus (PRSV) is transmitted by aphids and is the single 
most threatening factor to papaya production world-wide (Gonsalves, 1998). 
Following infection, PRSV compromises the photosynthetic abilities of the upper 
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leaves of the tree, leading to diminished vigor, stunted growth, and poor fruit quality.  
Ultimately, the plant  dies. 
 PRSV was identified on the Hawaiian island of Oahu in the 1940’s and became 
a significant threat to the industry in the 1950’s.  The industry was moved to the then 
virus-free island of Hawaii where it thrived in the climatically hospitable Puna region, 
producing 95% of Hawaiian papaya in the 1970’s (Gonsalves et al.,  2004).  However, 
it was clear that the virus would eventually infest the island of Hawaii. 
 Key developments in the 1980’s put virologist Dennis Gonsalves in a timely 
position to apply relatively new biotechnology tools to solve the PRSV problem.  By 
that time, pathogen-derived resistance (PDR) had emerged as a promising strategy for 
controlling plant viruses, and viral coat proteins (CP) had proven to be effective 
elicitors of PDR (Abel et al., 1986).  Gonsalves and his collaborators developed a mild 
strain of PRSV for use in cross protection but had minimal success.  With the cloning 
of the CP gene of PRSV, the development of the gene gun (Sanford et al., 1987), and 
advances in tissue culture, they were able to transform papaya with the CP gene.  This 
approach was successful in rendering ‘Sunset’ papaya resistant to the virus 
(Gonsalves, 1998) and a homozygous line, named ‘SunUp’ was generated.  Resistant 
‘SunUp’ was crossed with a more transformation-resistant variety that is preferred by 
Hawaiian growers: the yellow-fleshed variety ‘Kapoho’.  The resulting line was 
named ‘Rainbow’ (Gonsalves, 1998).   
 
Success in Hawaii  
“For me I know the virus almost shut me down.  I am not going to go back and plant 
non-transgenic papaya anymore.  It’s too much of a gamble.” –Willie Julien, 
Hawaiian grower. 
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 The field trial of the trangenic line began in 1992 on the infested island of 
Oahu, and by the end of that year the researchers reported that all non-transgenic 
papaya trees were infected, while the transgenics resisted the virus (Gonsalves et al., 
2004).   As feared, PRSV hopped islands and by 1995 the industry was in crisis, with 
trickle-down effects that threatened the economy of Hawaii (the “Big Island”) as a 
whole.   
 Fortunately, that year also marked the start of a large-scale in situ field trial of 
‘Rainbow’ (Gonsalves et al., 2004). The viral resistance of the transgenic plants 
directly demonstrated the promise of GE papaya to anxious growers, fruit packers, 
policy makers, regulators, and scientists.  In 1996, the team began filing petitions with 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to deregulate transgenic 
papaya and consulting with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for food safety 
approval (Gonsalves, 2004).  In 1998, seeds were made commercially available to 
Hawaiian farmers.  The technology became available in time to save the industry, and 
the Papaya Administrative Committee (PAC) obtained regulatory approval before 
anti-GE campaigns gained household notoriety.  Intellectual property rights and the 
freedom to operate were negotiated by Cornell University on behalf of the PAC 
(Cahoon, 2003).  Among those battles were disputes over PDR, the use of antibiotic 
resistance genes and the 35S cauliflower mosaic virus promoter, and regaining the 
rights to use the gene gun after the technology had been licensed to DuPont (R. 
Cahoon, personal communication). 
 Once seeds were available to growers, adoption was remarkably rapid 
compared to other GE crops; within the first year, 98% of Puna growers had registered 
with the PAC to receive the seed, and 73% were growing it (C. Gonsalves et al.,  
2004). By the second year, 56% of the fruit-bearing acreage was transgenic.  Small-
 58 
scale growers (0.4-2.4 hectares of papaya) adopted the technology most rapidly.  
Perhaps most significantly, the availability of GE papaya brought growers back into 
the papaya business after struggling to find other means of income during the 
epidemic (C. Gonsalves et al., 2007). 
 Adoption was rapid for several reasons: positive communication campaigns, 
farmer engagement during the R&D and field trials, distribution of approximately 
1,134 kilograms of free seeds to registered growers, and the fact that the technology 
addressed an immediate problem affecting farmers’ livelihoods (C. Gonsalves et al., 
2004). 
 
GE Papaya in the Developing World 
“Here people cannot afford vanity” – Dr. M. Abdul Momin, Principal Scientific 
Officer, On-Farm Research Division, Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute, 
Pabna. 
 Papaya is predominantly produced and consumed in the developing world.  It 
is high in vitamin C and rich in pro-vitamin A carotenoids, both of which indirectly 
facilitate iron uptake.  Thus, it helps alleviate two of the “big three” micronutrient 
deficiencies that plague undernourished people globally (iron, vitamin A, and iodine).  
A 100-gram serving of ripe papaya (about a quarter of a small Hawaiian papaya), 
provides 133% of the recommended daily intake (RDI) of vitamin C for an adult and 
33% of the RDI for vitamin A (Duxbury, 2003).   
 Papaya is consumed in the developing world as a fresh fruit, as a raw green 
vegetable in salads, and as a cooked vegetable. Although produced on a commercial 
scale in many developing countries, papaya is also a popular crop in the backyard 
“kitchen gardens” of subsistence farmers, as it is easily grown from seed, produces 
fruit within the first year after planting, and requires few inputs.  Although a minor 
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crop by global commodity standards, papaya holds considerable promise for 
diversifying the diet of the rural poor in tropical countries.  Unfortunately, in most 
countries, papaya suffers from the ringspot virus, limiting its productivity 
commercially, as well as in the backyard (C. Gonsalves et al.,  2007).   
 The developers of the first transgenic papaya envisaged the GE variety as a 
promising pro-poor product of biotechnology and were eager to collaborate with 
researchers from around the developing world.  Suitable GE, virus-resistant varieties 
have now been developed for Brazil, Jamaica, Venezuela, Thailand, China, and The 
Philippines, among other countries.  Yet, in no place outside Hawaii have growers or 
consumers reaped the benefits of these plants. In a recent paper, C. Gonsalves and her 
colleagues (2007) highlighted how many challenges that developing countries face 
during adoption of GE papaya were overcome in Hawaii.  The authors argue that this 
technology is particularly suitable for low-income farmers.  With regard to consumer 
demand, the nutritional value of papaya—while important to Hawaiian consumers—is 
even more crucial in developing countries where papaya is already popular.  GE 
papaya does not require changes in management practices or large capital investments, 
it does not alter production costs, and access to intellectual property is already being 
negotiated in several countries in a philanthropic manner (C. Gonsalves et al., 2007).  
Since the effects of PRSV have been as devastating in other countries as they were in 
Hawaii, there is a clear need for a solution, and a demand by increasingly vocal 
growers. 
 
A Failure to Adopt 
“Papaya is being devastated and we have a solution right here. It all comes down to 
political will.  If you want to have impact, you have to be political.  That is the essence 
of modern life.”  -Dennis Gonsalves 
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 If papaya is such a promising transgenic crop, why is it not being grown across 
the tropics?  Although the reasons vary to some degree from country to country, 
prominent themes emerge globally.  There is a lack of farmer engagement in the 
debate, and to the extent that networking with farmers does occur, it is often 
dominated by anti-GE non-governmental organization (NGO) networks and less by 
government or university extension agents.  Many developing countries still lack 
biosafety laws and too often countries lack sufficient infrastructure and training to 
carry out the regulatory testing needed prior to commercialization. Fear of biopiracy 
by foreign entities is directly tied to concerns over intellectual property since most of 
the IP has been developed and previously implemented in wealthier nations.  Finally, 
many countries’ markets are dependent on the political and consumer demands of 
importing countries.  Some understanding of how these hurdles have obstructed the 
adoption of GE papaya in developing countries can be gained by examining the case 
in Thailand, which in many regards has become the hotbed for the controversy around 
GE, PRSV-resistant papaya.  There it has become the “poster child,” both literally and 
figuratively, for the debate over agricultural biotechnology in general. 
 
The Battle over GE Papaya in Thailand 
“The controversy in Thailand [over papaya] between the government and a small 
group of activists is making things slow down in our country and is only getting 
worse.” -Vilai Prasartsee, Director,  Khon Kaen Plant Material and Technical Service 
Center, Thai Department of Agriculture.  
 Thailand is a major food exporter and a regional leader in intellectual 
manpower and technical resources. The country embraced genetic engineering early 
on and, relative to other developing countries, a lack of infrastructure has not been the 
primary obstacle to biotech crop adoption.  The Plant Genetic and Engineering Unit, 
 61 
located on the Kampaengsaen Campus of Kasetsart University, first applied advanced 
techniques in biotechnology in 1985 (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  In subsequent 
years, many GE crops were developed in the country and forty transgenic crops were 
approved for study in Thailand during the period from 1992- 2000 (Sriwatanapongse 
et al., 2007). 
 Papaya is grown in all regions of Thailand at the commercial level, and by 
small-scale farmers who typically plant papaya trees in backyard gardens or peripheral 
to paddy fields.  Thailand produces less than 2% of the world’s papaya crop, and ranks 
as the world’s 12th largest producer (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  Ninety percent of 
all papaya grown in Thailand is consumed domestically, and the remainder is exported 
as canned fruit salad (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  Beyond its nutritional value, 
papaya is an important food culturally; it is not uncommon for Thai people to consume 
green papaya salad, “som tam,” daily, particularly in the northeast region of Isaan. 
 As in most countries, the greatest limitation to papaya production in Thailand 
is PRSV, first observed there in 1975 (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  In 1981, Vilai 
Prasartsee, a researcher with the Thai Department of Agriculture, initiated efforts to 
control the virus through an eradication program (Thitiprasert, 2003).  Although this 
seemed a viable solution, the reluctance of villagers to cut down infected trees that had 
already set fruit limited its success (Prasartsee, personal communication).  In 1986, 
Prasartsee contacted Gonsalves who was experimenting at the time with cross 
protection.  With funds from USAID and the Thai Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, they began a collaboration that paralleled efforts for Hawaii.  In 1995, 
two scientists from Thailand went to the Gonsalves laboratory at Cornell to develop 
GE PRSV-resistant lines.  Two Thai-preferred varieties were transformed using 
microprojectile bombardment.  The construct contained a non-translatable CP gene 
isolated from a Thai strain of the virus.  Since the CP is not translated, no detectable 
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amounts of foreign CP are present in the transformed papaya (Sakuanrungsirikul et al.,  
2004). 
 In 1997, further breeding efforts continued in greenhouses, and confined field 
trials were conducted from 1999 until 2004, when they were banned.  Third generation 
lines from both varieties were 97-100% resistant to the virus.  In addition, the Thai 
group began assessing the safety of GE papaya.  Between 2001 and 2004, six sets of 
experiments were conducted that showed no ecological effects of GE papaya on 
adjacent non-GE trees, microbial flora, beneficial insects or the surrounding soil.  No 
differences in nutritional quality were found, no allergenic proteins or toxic attributes 
were observed, and rats fed GE papaya did not show any abnormalities 
(Sakuanrungsirikul et al., 2004).   
 The July, 2004 Greenpeace protest undermined the previous decade of 
research. There, Greenpeace charged that GE papaya had been distributed beyond the 
confines of the field trial under the negligence of the DOA, and presented evidence of 
the antibiotic resistance gene nptII and the 35S cauliflower mosaic virus promoter in 
papaya being grown illegally by farmers in 37 provinces (Wongruang, 2004).  The 
DOA responded by charging two Greenpeace campaigners with trespassing, theft, and 
destruction of property; the activists were acquitted in 2006.  In September, 2004, the 
Agriculture Minister confirmed the seed leak when one sample of 239 from farmers 
who had purchased what was assumed to be non-GE papaya from the research station 
tested positive (Samabuddhi, 2004a).  The Minister ordered the eradication of all trees 
on the test-positive farm, and testing of plants from all 2,600 registered recipients of 
papaya seeds from the station.  As a final blow, he ordered the destruction of the field 
trial at Tha Pra.  Station workers cut down all of the trees in the 1.8 ha plot and buried 
the plant material in pits onsite.  The Prime Minister ordered the destruction of all 
field trials in the country, following a cabinet decision to place a moratorium on all 
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confined field trials in Thailand in addition to the 2001 ban on open field trials.  This 
brought research on agricultural biotechnology practically to a standstill 
(Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007). 
 During the period from 2005 to 2006, the battle between Greenpeace and the 
DOA took place primarily in Thai courtrooms.  Despite the ongoing hearings, the 
National Policy on Biotechnology Committee, chaired by then Prime Minster Thaksin 
Shinawatra, submitted a draft of the National Policy on Biotechnology in 2005, though 
the policy specific to the application of genetic engineering is still pending 
(Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).    A Draft of the National Biosafety Law, ultimately 
overseen by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, was completed in 
2005 and has been under public review since that date (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007). 
 On September 19, 2006, the Thaksin government was ousted overnight in a 
quick coup d’état, which severely delayed any progress towards passing legislation on 
biotechnology.  However, the interim post-coup government put a biotech advocate, 
plant virologist Dr. Thira Sutabutra, in the post of Minister of Agriculture.  The 
Ministry’s attempts to move toward lifting the moratorium were thwarted by 
demonstrators throughout 2007.  Thira was scheduled to submit a proposal to the Thai 
cabinet to lift the ban on August 28th, 2007.  However, before he reached the cabinet 
meeting, Greenpeace dumped roughly ten metric tons of papaya in front of the 
Ministry of Agriculture building. The activity was effective in delaying the meeting 
item, but the chaos that ensued outside the ministry was a fascinating test of consumer 
acceptance of GE papaya. Despite protesters dressed as  “GMO Zombie” fruits and 
alien eyeballs, passers-by reportedly pilfered as much of the papaya as they could 
(Bangkok Post, 2007a).   Almost certainly, the papaya was not transgenic, but the 
consumer message was clear and widely reported as a “backfire” on the Greenpeace 
activity.  With little time left in his interim post, Thira made his final push on 
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December 25th, just two days after the 2007 Thai general election. The cabinet turned 
down a proposal to end the 2001 moratorium, deciding to leave the decision to the 
next administration (Bangkok Post, 2007b).  However, the cabinet did put forth a 
compromise resolution that will allow limited field trials in government-secured 
facilities.  Each application must be approved by the cabinet and will be open for 
public review—obstacles that may make field trials practically impossible.  What’s 
more, it remains to be determined whether the resolution will hold up in court. 
 
Players in the GE Papaya Controversy 
Farmers 
“Yes, I have grown GE papaya.  I received it from my brother.  People told him if he 
ate it, he would be infertile.  However, I ate the fruits from this papaya and they are 
delicious.”  -an Isaan farmer. 
 The DOA was not the only victim of Greenpeace’s 2004 activity. Farmers who 
purchased non-GE seed from the station were those whose livelihoods were most 
immediately affected (Wongruang, 2004; Prasartsee, personal communication).  The 
story below illustrates what happened to a particular grower following the 2004 
events. Her experience in many ways parallels that of other small farmers who found 
themselves in the crossfire. 
 Mrs. Somkuan Sriwongchotisakul is a fifty-five year-old widow with a 4.8 ha 
orchard on her mixed farm outside a small village in the heart of Isaan. 
Sriwongchotisakul took out an 80,000 Thai Baht loan (currently valued at $2,555 
USD), for labor and materials needed for papaya cultivation (Sriwongchotisakul, 
personal communication). In 2003, Sriwongchotisakul, leading a cooperative of 50 
village members, purchased 5000 supposedly non-GE papaya seedlings from the 
station and was registered as a seed recipient (Samabuddhi, 2004b). Several months 
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later, Greenpeace GE campaigners came to her farm to sample her trees and confirm 
that Sriwongchotisakul had obtained seeds from the Tha Pra station.  The day after the 
protest at Tha Pra, a group came to collect samples of her fruits and left with several 
bags for testing.  Subsequently, Greenpeace announced that it was genetically 
modified.   
 Following this finding, the village chief announced to Sriwongchotisakul’s 
neighbors that her papaya was illegal and harmful to human health  “There were 
posters that said that this papaya was Dracula and if anyone eats it they will die,” 
Sriwongchotisakul recalled.  Local officials ordered the destruction of her trees.  
Sriwongchotisakul has since abandoned her plan to earn a living growing papaya and 
selling som tam locally; however, her unpaid bank loan looms large.  The animosity 
between her and many of the villagers remains and she has largely removed herself 
from village social life (Sriwongchotisakul, personal communication). 
 Despite the impact that GE papaya had on farmers like Sriwongchotisakul, 
who were targeted during the 2004 event, most small-scale farmers in her position 
have little to no knowledge of GE crops.  Responses from a study undertaken by the 
Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA, 
2005), indicated that 38% of northeastern farmers were unaware of the meaning of GE 
papaya.  Sixty-four percent claimed to be aware of the technology, but only 37% had a 
correct understanding.  In a study two years later, I found that whereas only 55% of 
farmers were familiar with the Thai term for PRSV, 95% said their trees suffered from 
the described symptoms (S.N. Davidson, unpublished data).  When asked if they had 
heard of traditional breeding techniques to make hybrids, 55% said they had.  Ninety-
four percent of respondents approved of the technique, 3% did not, and another 3% 
were unsure.  When asked if they had heard of genetic engineering, 30% said they 
had.  Despite this low number, after the concept was explained, 81% of farmers 
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approved of the methods, 5% did not, and 14% were unsure.  When asked what they 
associated with genetic engineering methods, many declined to respond, since they 
were not familiar with them.  Those who did respond made overwhelmingly positive 
associations, using words like “development,” “progression,” “getting rich,” and 
“abundance of fruit.”  Eighty-five percent of farmers said they would plant GE papaya 
if it were resistant to the disease.  Ten percent were unsure if they would plant it and 
5% said they already had planted GE papaya.  No farmers said they would not plant it. 
   
 
The Opposition 
 “Technology that isn’t Thai isn’t good for Thailand.”  – Natwipha Ewasakul, GE 
Campaigner, Greenpeace Southeast Asia 
 The activities of the multinational arms of Greenpeace International (GPI) 
have weighed heavily on the controversy around biotech papaya in Thailand.  It is 
arguable that without the influence, both financial and ideological, of the European-
based group, the cabinet’s ban on GE crops may never have come to pass.  Thus, in 
considering the case of GE papaya in Thailand, it is important to understand the role 
that this particular organization has played in rendering the papaya a forbidden fruit. 
 The regional Greenpeace offices worldwide operate like franchises of the 
larger GPI organization in the Netherlands.  Regional offices subscribe to a locally 
relevant subset of campaigns put forth by GPI, and to varying degrees are financially 
dependent on GPI.  According to Jiragorn Gajaseni, who served as Executive Director 
of Greenpeace Southeast Asia (GPSEA) from 2000-2004, Bangkok-based GPSEA 
receives roughly 90% of their annual operating costs from GPI. According to 
Gajaseni, Bangkok was chosen as the home of the Southeast Asia office because it 
offered financial and political support (Gajaseni, personal communication). 
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Approximately 200,000 people in urban Bangkok donate an average of 100 Baht 
($3.20 USD) per month (Gajaseni, personal communication). Also, at that time 
Thailand was open politically and had a relatively free press.  “But in countries like 
Vietnam,” Gajaseni explained, “you could not do the Greenpeace kinds of campaigns, 
Greenpeace style.”  The strategic development of GPSEA’s campaigns in Thailand 
has followed a growth-by-success pattern.  Early on, Gajaseni cancelled a campaign 
on forest protection and focused on the anti-GE campaign since their campaigners 
were successful in attracting media attention, boosting the image of the Greenpeace 
“brand” (Gajaseni, personal communication). Gajaseni calls the campaign against GE 
papaya as one of the “highlights of Greenpeace Southeast Asia.”  
 Gajaseni readily admits that Greenpeace’s style of campaign can be “too 
radical for Thai people.”  But according to him, campaigning in a more culturally 
sensitive way was not effective. They focus on networking and an “aggressive” 
strategy (Gajaseni, personal communication).  “We have to hit the right spot,” 
Gajaseni explained.  Determining how and where to hit is decided during annual 
assessments of each campaign.  “In the [2004] Khon Kaen example, it was very 
clear… .  It was the biggest [field trial].” “If you hit the Tha Pra research station and 
hit GMO papaya where [papaya] is the basic food for Isaan people, you can be more 
effective.”  Gajaseni explained, “After our campaign in Isaan there were a lot of local 
organizations that raised hell about the GE papaya as well as to the government.” He 
concluded, “We are catalysts.” 
 Although fighting the zero-tolerance policies of Greenpeace may seem a 
daunting endeavor for scientists, not all anti-GE advocacy groups are as hard-headed.  
BioThai is a homegrown Bangkok-based watchdog group founded in 1995 to preserve 
Thailand’s rich biodiversity.  Although in principle the group is opposed to genetic 
engineering, their outlook is not as narrow as Greenpeace’s zero-tolerance policy.  
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BioThai Director Wintoon Lianchamroon explains, “In reality, we are still working 
within this country and we have friends in the academy who have invested many years 
of research on GE crops so we have to work with them so they can do their work... so 
we ask them to keep it in the laboratory or greenhouse… .This is different from 
Greenpeace.”  The group separates itself from Greenpeace on cultural grounds as well. 
“Greenpeace is an international NGO… .There may be some cases when they don’t 
know the cultural situation or the political or economic situation in this country or the 
culture of the local people.  We have to think a lot about these factors before we 
launch our own lobby work,” Lianchamroon said.  Although BioThai often 
collaborates with Greenpeace as well as other NGOs in Thailand, their modus 
operandi is distinct.  “There are some cases, which we cannot do.  The case of when 
they destroyed the papaya, this we cannot do, mostly due to our [Thai] culture,” 
Lianchamroon explained (Lianchamroon, personal communication). 
 
The Media 
“GM Food Not Safe, Warns US Campaigner.” –December 3rd, 2007 headline, 
Bangkok Post. 
 The Thai press is currently categorized by Freedom House as “partly free” and 
thus coverage of controversial issues such as genetic engineering is not due to lack of 
press freedom.  GPSEA’s increasing momentum is reflected in the media’s coverage 
of GE papaya and the government’s wavering position on biotech crops.  
 The Thai media coverage of GE papaya was low from 2001 to 2002, but 
subsequently underwent a “hoopla effect” in 2004 (Xiang, 2007 p34), precipitated by 
Greenpeace’s accusations that the DOA released transgenic papaya seeds from the Tha 
Pra research station.  This acted as a “trigger” event in coverage of GE papaya in the 
second half of that year, and it remained a hot topic for some time (Xiang, 2007 p34).  
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In 2005, when Greenpeace and the DOA were in court hearings, coverage dropped.  It 
picked up again in 2007 as Greenpeace pushed to prevent the cabinet from lifting the 
ban on field trials in late August and again in December, prior to the general election.  
 In a comparative analysis of media coverage of GE crops in China (GE rice), 
Thailand (GE papaya) and the US (GE rice and papaya), Xiang (2007 p36) found that 
stories in the Thai press demonstrated the most negative attitudes toward GE crops, 
likely due to the intense use of anti-GE advocacy groups, such as Greenpeace, as news 
sources.  Xiang (2007 p39-40) observed that American newspapers reporting on GE 
papaya were more likely to cite scientific journals, industry representatives, and 
farmers than their counterparts in Thailand.  In contrast, Thai newspapers 
overwhelmingly cited advocacy groups while scientists were the least frequently cited. 
 
The Intellectual Property Issue 
“The secrecy surrounding US patents on Thai GE papaya - including the new patents 
now in process - adds to the unknown risks that this genetic experiment poses to Thai 
farmers, consumers and the environment.” –Greenpeace SEAsia website 
 Issues relating to intellectual property have further fueled the debate.  In the 
Thai media, the Cornell Research Foundation (CRF), which handles intellectual 
property issues at Cornell University, has come under scrutiny, spurred largely by 
accusations from activist groups that Cornell is stealing Thai property: the coat protein 
gene sequence from the Thai PRSV isolate (Greenpeace Southeast Asia, 2004).  
 Because the molecular work was conducted in laboratories at Cornell, that 
university assumed the sequence as its own intellectual property.  Coat protein 
sequences from isolates brought by researchers from other countries, such as Jamaica, 
Venezuela, and Brazil, were also covered by the patent that CRF filed (Cahoon, 
personal communication). 
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 Dennis Gonsalves and Richard Cahoon, Director of CRF, foresaw the problem 
that the Papaya Administrative Committee and other collaborating countries would not 
necessarily have the resources or political leverage to obtain technology licenses on 
their own (Cahoon, 2003).  In negotiating the rights to use the technologies for Hawaii 
(most of it owned by entities other than Cornell), the CRF arranged for the technology 
to be available to other countries. CRF acquired the licenses in each case, and could 
then legally transfer to each of the collaborating partners.  CRF subsequently 
transferred the licenses to the PAC and drew up a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the DOA in Thailand (Cahoon, personal communication).  The MoU with 
Thailand distinguishes humanitarian from commercial use.  According to the 
agreement, small farmers fall under the category of humanitarian users and should be 
able to use this technology without paying royalties.  The exact definition of 
commercial use is left up to the DOA in Thailand but should include any fruit that is 
exported (Cahoon, 2003). At the time of the 2004 Greenpeace activity, the DOA was 
expected to sign the drafted MOU (Cahoon, personal communication).  The MOU 
remains unsigned. 
 
The Pro-Poor Gateway Crop 
 All stakeholders involved, be they from industry, academia, or anti-GE activist 
groups, agree that in Thailand the battle over GE papaya is the one to win. They all see 
bioengineered papaya as a “gateway crop”—a forerunner for other genetically 
engineered crops.  Greenpeace views all genetically engineered crops as a threat to the 
safety of the world’s food supply. On the other hand, members of the foreign seed 
sector, though not directly involved in developing the DOA’s transgenic papaya, are 
promoting the promise of the farmer-friendly papaya, hoping it may open the doors for 
their own products.  Former GPSEA Director, Jiragorn Gajaseni, explains his position, 
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“Papaya is nothing.  But the reason why the biotech [sector] is pushing for the papaya 
is because they want papaya as a front leader to open the gates for another big crop in 
this part of the world.  This is rice” (Gajaseni, personal communication).   Gajaseni 
admits that the researchers in Tha Pra are “simply a small part of that.”  “That Tha Pra 
got targeted is just bad luck [for them].”  So if even a pro-poor, best-case scenario 
crop cannot make it through the barricades of anti-GE activists, where is the hope for 
the next generation of biotech crops? 
 
The Next Generation of Biotech Crops Meets the Next Generation of Plant 
Biologists 
“I still feel this void since we still haven’t fully transferred the technology to 
developing countries and I fear time is running out on me.  That’s my main unsolved 
challenge.” 
 –Dennis Gonsalves 
 I would argue that hope for the next generation of biotech crops can be found 
in lessons from the previous one.  What transpired in Thailand provides take-home 
messages that could provide scientists with insights on how to transfer the benefits of 
their research from the laboratory to the farmers and consumers who need it most.    
 Cultural awareness is essential.  Assessing farmer needs provides insight into 
whether the technology in question is solving a problem that farmers confront, and 
whether they are likely to adopt. By employing the same grassroots networking 
strategies that opponents to genetic engineering have used so effectively, relationships 
with local growers can be established, aiding cross-cultural understanding.  This was a 
major difference between the Hawaii and Thai situations.  Engaging growers, as was 
done in Hawaii, develops channels for effective education campaigns. Farmers are 
some of the most eager adopters of new technology if they see it as a means of rising 
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beyond their current standard of living—but they need to hear about it.  Technology 
generated domestically is much more readily embraced by developing countries than 
those perceived as foreign, as demonstrated by the case in the Philippines (R. Hautea, 
personal communication ).  Collaborating with regional researchers and promoting 
technology development in-country also fosters the future capacity of the country in 
question.  
 Economic factors weigh heavily.  It is estimated that if GE papaya were 
adopted in Thailand and production returned to historical peak levels, yields would 
increase by 471% and the annual economic benefit for Thailand would be roughly 
$880 million USD (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  Considering export markets is also 
critical.  In the case of Thailand, 90% of the papaya is consumed domestically.  Yet a 
portion of the 10% exported as canned fruit salad goes to Europe, which places 
constraints on the industry as a whole.   
 Political policies are just as crucial. The absence of biosafety laws can make it 
easier for anti-GE groups to claim that crops will be introduced injudiciously. If the 
country lacks the infrastructure and technical know-how to conduct regulatory testing, 
it is important to ask who will steward the technology through those necessary steps. 
 Finally, it is time to meet the press.  While scientists are not generally trained 
in media communication, who is better qualified to discuss the risks and benefits of 
GE crops?  If scientists do not undertake this task, where will the public get their 
information? 
 If the next generation of biotech crops is to make an impact on those who 
arguably have the most to gain and have yet to reap the benefits of the first 
generation—those of the developing world—then it is time for plant biotechnologists 
to move beyond the bench, kick around in some barren soils, man a water buffalo for a 
day, meet the people whose lives will be impacted, and display the same amount of 
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passion for having their technology used in the field as they have for developing it in 
the laboratory.  It is time to get organized, get political, get heard, and get out of the 
lab.  Otherwise, the fruits of this fascinating research may remain forbidden. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
SWEET SCIENCE 
 
The News 
This article was written as a news story in response to a time-sensitive news hook that 
served as a compelling case for publication.  The news hook was the 2006 coup d’état 
in Thailand.   It was pitched to the science editor of the weekly publication, The 
Economist.  It was not published and the time-sensitive nature of the news hook 
caused the appeal of the article to quickly expire—a lesson in news writing indeed.  
The process of writing this article is dissected in Appendix A. 
 
 
Biotech heavyweights are putting up their dukes in a battle with Greenpeace over what 
may be biotechnology’s best bet yet: a virus-resistant papaya. Oddly, it is a battle over 
a product that on the surface, they have little to benefit from. 
 The match-up is over the ruinous papaya ringspot virus that devastated 
production in Hawaii until a resistant transgenic variety was introduced in 1998. The 
virus is equally unbridled in Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries with the 
same crippling effect. 
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Thailand’s Department of Agriculture (DOA) partnered with university 
researchers based in the United States as long ago as 1986 to find an answer for small-
scale Thai farmers. What seemed to be a promising solution came about 11 years later 
when the papaya team introduced an essential gene, the so-called coat protein gene, 
from the virus into one of Thailand’s favoured papaya varieties, allowing the 
transformed plant to shut down the spread of the hijacking virus. Owing to the plants’ 
natural immune system, no foreign coat protein is actually made, but the plants are 
effectively “vaccinated” against the virus. With public funds footing the bill, the seeds 
would be affordable to resource-poor farmers who consume nearly all of their papaya 
crop domestically. 
 So why the hub-bub? International Greenpeace’s Southeast Asia arm and their 
multinational biotech opponents have one thing in common: They both see the 
bioengineered papaya as a “gateway crop”—a portal through which other genetically 
engineered crops could creep into Thailand. Greenpeace views genetically engineered 
crops as a threat to the safety of the world’s food supply. Large biotech multinationals 
such as Monsanto, although they have not been directly involved in developing the 
DOA’s transgenic papaya, are promoting the promise of the papaya hoping that if 
approved it may open the floodgates for their own products.  
 In the meantime the backyard kitchen farmers of rural Thailand are reporting 
the highest infection rates ever since the virus first appeared in 1975 and the price of 
the green papaya, once plucked off of a tree for free in the backyard, has risen to 10 
baht a kilo (about .38 USD), a price most subsistence farmers can’t pay for their daily 
dish of som tam. 
 Thailand’s Department of Agriculture researcher Vilai Prasartsee and her 
collaborator, Hawaii-based Dennis Gonsalves find the whole controversy a little hard 
to digest.  “If you want to look for an ideal case [for genetic engineering], it’s tough to 
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beat the papaya. Monsanto is not involved and we’re just small university scientists 
doing the work, the growers control it, and it’s a great model,” Gonsalves says. “Their 
papaya is being devastated and we have a solution right there. It’s amazing. So it all 
comes down to political will.” 
 Although Gonsalves has seen the fruit of his labour since 1998 when Hawaiian 
farmers began producing virus-resistant papaya, Thai researcher, Prasartsee, now three 
years from retirement, has been all but knocked out of the ring. Her field station in 
North-east Thailand was attacked by Greenpeace activists in 2004, who made a huge 
media splash when they hopped the DOA fence and put on a show for previously 
invited media. Clad in their signature white personal protection suits they barrelled 
papaya from the station into biohazardous waste bins and announced to DOA 
researchers that they had DNA evidence that seeds sold by the DOA were 
contaminated with those of the still unapproved GE papaya. 
 Shortly thereafter, Prasartsee and her team literally buried years of research 
underground after receiving orders form the government to destroy all confined field 
trials of GE crops. The site of Prasartsee’s field test is now an overgrown weed patch. 
 With Greenpeace seemingly winning the battle, Thai papaya farmers began to 
mobilize in January of 2006, pleading with government officials to lift the ban on field 
trials so that the safety of GE papaya could be adequately studied. But last month the 
DOA took another blow when the Khon Kaen provincial courts acquitted two 
Greenpeace campaigners who had been charged with trespassing and theft of state 
property following the 2004 episode. 
 But with the recent political putsch and now a new interim government, no one 
knows when the bell will toll to signal the next round. With an interim government 
scrambling to run the show and only a year until the new election, few reckon that re-
evaluating the fate of GE papaya will be on the top of the new cabinet’s agenda.  
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 Bangkok-based George Fuller, executive director of CropLife Asia, an industry 
organization that represents five biotech giants in ASEAN, isn’t holding his breath. 
“Agriculture productivity is not high on the agenda in spite of the fact that most of the 
people in Thailand are involved in agriculture. This is related to the Thai bizzarro 
concept of democracy where only the opinions of the Bangkok elite should count,” 
Fuller wrote in an e-mail following Surayud’s appointment. 
 North-eastern farmers who favoured former Prime Minister Thaksin for his 
rural development strategies are apprehensive about the new crew in charge. A week 
into his new job as prime minister, Surayud made provinces in Thaksin’s north-eastern 
stronghold his first visits to a rural area, thought to be an intentional move to quiet 
dissatisfied Thaksin supporters. With rhetoric of the “sufficiency economy” flying 
around the country, the implications for agriculture aren’t yet explicit but north-
eastern farmers remain wary.  
 What Surayud did make clear to his rural audience were his plans to put Thai 
moral values above Western values. What Fuller fears “can be an excuse not to go 
with new-fangled foreign ideas like biotech.” 
 Even though the indiscriminate papaya ringspot virus doesn’t have much pull 
in Bangkok, it looks like the new government may well be politicking in its favour. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EXCERPTS FROM LIFE OF THE GREEN PLANT, A TEXTBOOK 
 
For students 
The following two pieces are excerpts from a sophomore-level plant physiology 
textbook titled, Life of the Green Plant, authored by Peter Davies, Arthur Galston and 
Sarah Davidson.  The text below was included in the chapter titled, “Plants, the 
Environment, Human Welfare and the Future.”  It is written for college students 
pursing the study of plant biology and horticulture. 
 
In Our World: A Case Study of Papaya Genetically Engineered for Disease 
Resistance 
 
Papaya (Carica papaya) is an important crop in the US state of Hawaii and 
tropical countries around the world. In countries such as Thailand it is a culturally 
important food and is eaten daily, prepared as a green papaya salad. Unfortunately, 
papaya worldwide is plagued by the papaya ringspot virus (PRSV), which decimates 
stands of papaya trees, leaving them sickly and unproductive. With very few 
exceptions, every papaya producing country in the world is severely affected by 
PRSV. Efforts to control PRSV using genetic engineering is thought by many to be 
one of the world’s greatest success stories in plant biotechnology, yet it is also one of 
the most politically charged.  
Dr. Dennis Gonsalves, a plant virologist then at Cornell University, teamed up 
with Dr. Richard Manshardt and Dr. Steve Ferreira, at the University of Hawaii in the 
early 1990’s to apply the tools of biotechnology to control PRSV in Hawaii. Viruses 
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are composed of a small replicating genome surrounded by a protein shell, referred to 
as the coat protein. From the work of Roger Beachy in the 1980’s, they knew that 
plants respond to foreign invaders in a way that is analogous to how humans respond 
to vaccines, so they reasoned that if the coat protein of the virus was expressed within 
the papaya plant, those transformed papaya plants would be effectively “vaccinated” 
and would be able to protect themselves from invading PRSV.  
The Gonsalves laboratory cloned the gene that codes for the coat protein of 
PRSV. The so-called “gene gun,” the tool that first enabled particle bombardment, had 
just been developed by John Sanford on the same campus as the Gonsalves laboratory, 
and the Gonsalves team were able to use it to insert the construct carrying the PRSV 
coat protein into a papaya variety. Once the coat protein was in the papaya cells, they 
regenerated mature plants employing tissue culture techniques optimized by Maureen 
Fitch, a graduate student working under the supervision of Richard Manshardt in 
Hawaii. After Fitch regenerated mature plants from a few transformed cells, 
Manshardt crossed the transformed variety with the locally preferred variety of 
papaya, which had proven more difficult to transform. The result was named 
“Rainbow” after the mascot of the University of Hawaii. This new genetically 
engineered variety has all of the characteristics that Hawaii farmers and consumers 
like: it is yellow fleshed, sweet in taste and high yielding, but is also PRSV resistant.  
The successes of the research team happened just in time. The virus had been 
lurking in backyards of the city of Hilo, Hawaii for over ten years. This was a major 
threat to Hawaii’s papaya industry as ninety five percent of Hawaii’s papaya is 
produced just 19 miles away from Hilo in a district called Puna. It was a matter of 
time before the virus would make its way to the papaya plantations. In 1991 the 
research team developed the first transgenic line and in 1992, the virus hit Puna and 
the papaya industry was soon devastated. The economy of the big island of Hawaii, 
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particularly in Puna and Hilo, is dependent on papaya production. When the virus hit, 
farmers went broke, were no longer able to hire workers who depended on papaya 
production for their livelihoods, and families struggled to make ends meet with little 
money or hope for their papaya crop. In 1995, the transgenic Rainbow variety was 
tested in field trials conducted by Ferreira and was able to stand up to the virus and 
produce abundant, healthy fruits.  
Because the virus-resistant papaya was made using genetic engineering, it is 
regulated by US federal agencies such as the FDA, the USDA and the EPA. The 
Gonsalves team had to show that the transgenic fruit was safe for people to eat and 
that growing the papaya trees was safe for the environment. They also had to get 
permission to use the molecular technologies that were patented by other researchers 
and companies that they had used to develop the transgenic PRSV-resistant papaya. 
This took three years, but would take much longer under today’s regulatory process. 
Finally, in 1998, the transgenic PRSV resistant seeds were given free to Hawaiian 
farmers. Although some farmers were skeptical, many jumped at the opportunity to 
plant virus resistant seeds. Soon, nearly all of the farmers in Puna were planting 
Rainbow seeds and the industry was revitalized. The papaya industry and the economy 
of the big island was largely restored. An additional benefit is that it is now much 
easier to grow non-GE papaya since there is less virus in the presence of PRSV-
resistant papaya. Thus, through the “co-existence” of GE and non-GE papaya, Hawaii 
is still able to maintain its export market with Japan, which currently does not accept 
genetically engineered papaya. 
Although the papaya industry in Hawaii was saved by applying biotechnology to 
combat the virus, many people reject food grown with the help of genetic engineering. 
Even though the US and Canada have been importing genetically engineered (GE) 
Rainbow papaya from Hawaii since 1999 and 2003 respectively, countries such as 
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Japan to date still do not allow the import of GE papaya, although they are currently 
reviewing their decision. 
Opposition groups such as Greenpeace are focused on stopping the papaya from 
getting through the deregulation process in countries like Japan and Thailand because 
they fear that this will open the door to other genetically modified crops—what they 
see as a threat to the safety of the world’s food supply. Large biotech multinationals 
are focused on the papaya for the same reasons. If the transgenic papaya is 
deregulated, it paves the way for them to introduce their own products to these new 
markets. The PRSV resistant papaya may be viewed as a “gateway crop” and 
stakeholders eagerly await to see what will happen in countries beyond the US. 
Meanwhile, countries such as Thailand, Bangladesh, Jamaica, and Venezuela 
struggle with their own strains of PRSV. Researchers from these countries set up 
collaborations with Gonsalves in the 1990’s to come to his laboratory to use the same 
techniques to develop PRSV-resistant papaya for their own country’s farmers. By 
1997, collaborators from Thailand were ready to return home with their own form of 
GE papaya. They began conducting their own field trials after they returned to 
Thailand and were able to show that it was able to withstand the virus and produce 
normal, healthy fruit. They continued field trials in order to gain approval for this new 
variety. 
However, pressured from activist groups who oppose genetic engineering, 
Thailand placed a ban on all open field tests in 2001. Despite this limitation, progress 
towards controlling the disease in Thailand was significant up until August of 2004. 
Legal field trials were underway when Greenpeace brought the issue to the media’s 
attention during a July 2004 protest. 
The Thai government, under pressure from the press following the event, banned 
all confined field trials and ordered all trees to be destroyed and properly disposed of 
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to prevent contamination and seed dissemination. The unfolding of the events of 2004 
has brought research on transgenic PRSV resistant papaya to standstill in Thailand. 
With increasing difficulties cultivating papaya due to the virus and the increasing 
need to ship papaya from other areas of the country, many poor Thai people no longer 
have access to this important food crop. For this reason, in 2005 farmers from the 
northeast region of Thailand began to mobilize, traveling to Bangkok to demand that 
politicians lift the ban on field testing of GE papaya. As this book goes to press, 
Thailand is at a critical juncture in deciding whether or not it will permit the 
production of transgenic papaya as a means to overcome PRSV. 
Unlike major commodities such as corn, rice, and soy, papaya is considered an 
“orphan crop” because it lacks the research dollars that large corporations spend on 
improving more agronomically lucrative crops. Papaya and squash are the only 
genetically modified horticultural food crops that have been commercialized to date in 
the US by publicly funded academic university researchers, rather than large multi-
national seed companies. 
 In most tropical countries the papaya is not a major commodity, but is grown in 
backyard “kitchen gardens” for rural poor farmers, the primary benefactors of GE 
papaya. Papaya is nutrient rich, providing a significant amount of vitamin A, rendering 
it a promising solution to vitamin and micronutrient deficiencies in rice-dominated 
diets of the much of the world’s poor. The creation of the PRSV papaya clearly has 
unique merits for subsistence agriculture and indigenous peoples. 
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Scientists at work: Dr. Dennis Gonsalves 
 
Dr. Dennis Gonsalves, Director, USDA ARS Pacific Basin Agricultural Research 
Center, Hilo, Hawaii, a plant virologist who applied biotechnology to control the 
papaya ringspot virus (PRSV) in papaya.  
 
Humble Beginnings 
Dennis Gonsalves considers his career to be very “event driven.” Part native 
Hawaiian, he grew up poor in a family of laborers on a sugar cane plantation in 
Kohala, Hawaii. The first break in his education came when he was invited to attend 
the Kamehameha school after the 8th grade. This school was set up by a Hawaiian 
princess to provide excellent schooling for the native kids of Hawaii. “All of the 
sudden I went from a barefooted guy in a one-room school to the richest school in 
Hawaii,” Gonsalves recalls. “We had three meals a day, I grew five inches in a year, 
and all kinds of opportunities arose.” 
 Life on the sugar plantation prompted Gonsalves to study plants. During the 
summers, he worked on the sugar plantation and part of his job was to hoe the weeds. 
“We had supervisors who would walk around and watch us working away in the 
fields. I’d look up at those guys and think- ‘Boy, if I could be a supervisor that would 
be great!’’” He matriculated in college at the University of Hawaii to take the 
coursework necessary to be a plantation supervisor. However, he soon switched to 
Horticulture and got a bachelor’s degree in that field. After graduation, Gonsalves was 
trying to figure out what to do next. “I was looking on a bulletin board one day and I 
saw an ad for a job on the island of Kauai for a plant pathology technician. I got the 
job and they put me out there, very isolated, on the island of Kauai.” His boss and 
future mentor, Eduardo Trujillo told him, ‘Dennis, there’s this disease on papaya. I 
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think it’s a virus. I want you to figure out what it is.’ Gonsalves knew little about plant 
viruses, but he started doing the work and became fascinated. “I had found my niche,” 
Dennis says. 
 He worked for Trujillo for a year and then did his master’s degree under his 
supervision, working on papaya viruses. He went on to The University of California at 
Davis to get a PhD in Plant Pathology with a special focus on plant viruses. 
 
Principal Contributions 
Gonsalves began his academic career at the University of Florida, where he 
worked on vegetable viruses before taking a position at Cornell University, where he 
taught Plant Pathology courses and continued to work on vegetable and grape viruses. 
He made significant contributions to controlling the grape viruses that cause leaf roll 
and stem pitting, among others. His laboratory was among the first to purify these 
viruses, characterize them on a molecular level and to provide diagnostic tools to 
detect them. His international involvement with plant viruses began in the late 1970’s 
when he went to Uruguay to help them index their grape viruses.  
 Perhaps the most significant event in Gonsalves career happened in 1984 when 
he ventured into the field of molecular biology. “I saw this new technology out there 
and I said, you know, I am a classical virologist, do I keep on in this field or do I 
venture into this new field of molecular biology.” In retrospect, Gonsalves recognizes 
that taking the risk of combining classical virology with molecular biology as one of 
the most important events in his career. “I knew nothing when I first started in 
molecular biology. But I knew that I wanted to clone the papaya ring spot virus coat 
protein gene, so I had to learn it,” Gonsalves recalls. Shortly thereafter, Gonsalves 
started a partnership with the Upjohn Company, cloned the coat protein from a virus 
that infects squash, and developed a genetically engineered, virus resistant squash.  
 88 
 Although Gonsalves is equally proud of the work he accomplished on grape 
and vegetable viruses, he is internationally renowned for his work on controlling 
viruses of papaya. Gonsalves and his collaborators are responsible for using genetic 
engineering to render the Hawaiian papaya resistant to its most threatening pest, the 
papaya ringspot virus. His work contributed significantly to restoring Hawaii’s papaya 
industry after it was decimated by the papaya ringspot virus in the 1990’s (see In Our 
World in this chapter). 
 
Goals: Achieved and Pending 
Gonsalves measures his success as a plant pathologist by his ability to control 
plant viruses for farmers. “When I saw the success in Hawaii I felt like I had really 
contributed something important for the people of Hawaii,” Gonsalves says. However, 
the opposition towards genetic engineering in other countries has stalled his long-term 
goals of helping poor farmers in developing countries. Gonsalves feels saddened that 
the technology hasn’t been implemented in other countries. “This is my main unsolved 
goal. And I don’t think that it is because of science, technology, costs or knowing what 
to do.” Gonsalves says that the poor people of Thailand and other developing 
countries are living without healthy papaya because of political problems that, despite 
years of speaking with oppositional groups and politicians, are beyond his control. 
 Gonsalves’ genetically engineered papaya and squash are the only commercial 
products on the market to date that were developed by a university researcher with 
public funds, unlike many of the genetically engineered crops developed by large 
multi-national seed companies. The practical implications of his work as an academic 
plant pathologist are that he developed a tried and true technique of inserting the coat 
protein of the virus into the plant to essentially “vaccinate” the plant against the virus 
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and he has gone beyond the laboratory to show that this really works in real life field 
conditions.  
 By Gonsalves’ yardstick, this is success as a plant pathologist. He hopes that 
one day, rural Thai farmers will be able to grow papaya, which as a rich source of 
vitamins, could help alleviate dietary disorders in these poor countries. Gonsalves is 
an unusual scientist. Following his success in the laboratory, he kept going. 
Determined to see PRSV-resistant papaya in the hands of farmers, he characterized the 
papaya, took it through product development and filed the necessary applications to 
deregulate the seeds. Gonsalves continues to struggle to transfer the technology to 
farmers in developing countries and in collaboration with his wife, Carol, measure the 
impact PRSV-resistant papaya has on farmer livelihood and on the environment. 
 
Current Work 
Gonsalves moved back to Hawaii in 2002 to direct the USDA Pacific Basin 
Agricultural Research Center, and remains active in PRSV-control and research. His 
current work is aimed at developing universal resistance to many strains of PRSV. He 
is developing constructs for broad resistance by linking together small segments of the 
coat protein genes from different strains of the virus from around the world. In 
addition, he aims to develop a “universal recipe” that virologists around the world can 
apply to any vegetable virus, providing resistance in a repeatable manner, very 
quickly.  
 Gonsalves’ wife, Carol, has been studying the language and dances of the native 
Hawaiians since their return to Hawaii. He plays the ukulele and the Hawaiian steel 
guitar and together they enjoy singing traditional Hawaiian folk songs. “I feel like 
music is an international language and I use it a lot in my international work to 
connect with people of other countries and cultures.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE SOUR STORY OF PAPAYA IN THAILAND 
 
Creative non-fiction 
“The Sour Story of Papaya in Thailand” represents the style of creative non-fiction 
published in magazines such as Harper’s, The New Yorker, or Vanity Fair.  It was 
written for a well-educated, literate audience of non-scientists.  The article 
contextualizes the controversy over genetically engineered papaya in Thailand within 
the larger issue of globalization. Publication is pending. 
 
 
Subtext:  
What could be sweeter than a papaya immune to its fiercest natural enemy, the 
papaya ringspot virus? In the mid-1990s, university researchers using public funds 
created a virus-resistant, genetically-modified papaya for Hawaiian farmers. Grown in 
Hawaii for over ten years, this papaya has had no negative effects on the environment 
or human health.  With a philanthropic and global vision, the scientists who developed 
it hoped to bring their sweet science to resource-poor farmers in the developing world.  
Yet, when Western-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fighting 
genetically modified crops went from touting ‘not in my backyard’ to ‘not in your 
backyard,’ the technology went sour. 
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BODY: 
Pok. Pok. Pok. Pok. Pok.  The rhythmic sound of a wooden pestle against clay 
mortar echoes around the sparse farmyard. A rare breeze passes.  Mae Somkhuan sets 
down the pestle, removes the conical straw hat she wears to protect her face—
browned and aged from years of labor under a merciless sun—and wipes her brow 
with her sleeved forearm. This is not Paradise, Thailand.   
She replaces her hat and grabs a handful of shredded green papaya to add to 
her chili-garlic mash.  The pok-pok resumes. She gives a pesky chicken a small kick 
with her foot and reaches for a clay canister the size of an industrial-scale jar of 
mayonnaise that holds her prized sauce. As she lifts the lid, the volatile stink of 
fermented fish permeates the hot air and lingers in my nose long after she replaces the 
lid.  The fish sauce that Mae ferments annually in trash barrel quantities is the 
signature ingredient of her green papaya salad, the dish for which she is locally 
famous, and which she once hoped would feed her family—in more ways than one. 
But small-scale Thai papaya farmers like Mae Somkhuan were caught in the 
crossfire of an increasingly global debate over genetically modified (GM) crops.  Mae 
got blindsided by globalization—not once, but twice. After purchasing seed from a 
government research station where GM seed accidently got into the mix, she 
unknowingly grew GM papaya that was not yet released for farmer use.  She got 
blown over again, when a foreign movement that opposed the technology found her 
illicit fruit and stymied the development of GM technology in Thailand. 
Mae’s modest co-op sits on the edge of a small rice-producing village in the 
northeastern province of Khon Kaen, Thailand.  Her village is one that typifies 
northeastern Thailand’s Isaan region, where people have more in common culturally 
with their Lao neighbors to the north than with their southern Thai compatriots.  Here, 
modest farmers of Lao decent scrape out a simple living growing rice.  Between the 
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vast paddy fields, farmers set aside small patches of land to grow other cash crops like 
sugarcane, or, more recently, cassava.  They also grow fruits such as papaya, 
vegetables, and herbs for home consumption.  Farmers are encouraged by grower’s 
organizations, governmental programs, and experience to diversify their crops and 
secure their livelihoods by growing what they need to eat before selling cash crops in 
the market place—what Bangkok bureaucrats refer to as part of a “sufficiency 
economy.”  A flat, dry, agricultural region that reaches the Lao border on its northern 
and eastern edge, Isaan is one of Thailand’s poorest regions, one bypassed by the 
tourists that have fattened the economies of more idyllic Thai destinations.  
If you are what you eat, Isaan Thais would be made up of a whole lot of 
papaya—second only, perhaps, to their sticky rice mainstay.  Green papaya salad, or 
som tam, which means “sour pounded,” is a staple in the Thai diet.  Save for the 
toothless and the old (whose tolerance for spice often diminishes with age), most 
people eat it daily.  City dwellers stop at hodge-podge street stalls for a quick lunch of 
som tam, and farmers working in the paddy fields eat it with sticky rice.  Although the 
dish is consumed throughout Thailand, it originated in Laos, and the people of the 
Isaan region have a particularly eager appetite for it.  Mae has won awards for her som 
tam.  The secret, she says, is in the way she cures her fermented fish sauce. 
Five years ago, Mae Somkhuan and her niece had high hopes of building a 
business around papaya. Mae took out an 80,000 Thai Baht loan (roughly 2,000 USD) 
to secure labor and materials to start cultivating papaya for a field-to-fork som tam 
business.  In previous years she was hired about five times a month to make som tam 
for parties or exhibitions.  She found she could make around 1000 baht (about 30 
USD) per day—four times what a field laborer brings home.  If she could produce her 
own papaya, she could cut out the added expense of buying her main ingredient from 
the market.  In 2003 she invested heavily, hoping for a productive crop the following 
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year. With a bank loan in her pocket, land was cleared, an irrigation pond dug, and 
seed of varieties best suited for som tam were purchased from the Thai Department of 
Agriculture.   
Farmers are historically some of the most active agents of globalization.  Mae 
Somkhuan isn’t one to balk at the effects of globalization any more than her fellow 
villagers are.  With open arms they have embraced foreign motor scooters, new cash 
crops, and the television sets that are poised prominently in their homes. Even their 
well-worn t-shirts tout slogans in English like “Smoking kills” and “I’m on fire for 
Jesus.” Globalization is everywhere and there are hardly signs of antipathy.   
Farmers have bet on the globalized science of agriculture at least since the 
green revolution of the 1960s, if not since the days when trails were blazed on the 
spice route or when Europeans sailed to collect New World food crops.  In choosing 
new crops and varieties to plant, in their challenge to adapt improved varieties to local 
conditions, in their battles with pests, and the interlacing of their livelihoods with 
global commodity prices, the nature of their work has implications far beyond their 
own fields. Certainly the diseases that destroy their crops regard no borders. 
The papaya ringspot virus (PRSV)—a papaya plague that not only is sweeping 
through Thailand, but is the biggest limitation to papaya production worldwide—was 
first reported in Thailand in 1975, in Isaan.  Well established there for a few decades, 
the virus now threatens orchards in even the most remote regions of Thailand.  The 
virus is spread rapidly by a small aphid insect that is difficult to control with chemicals 
or other means.  Because of the significant place papaya holds in their culture and diet, 
the effects of PRSV have hit Thais hard. For rural folks, the disease has severely 
limited their ability to be self-sufficient in papaya.  Commercial growers are faced 
with the same biotic challenge, so the price of the papaya has skyrocketed, gouging 
resource-poor Thais, like Mae, who shop in the market.  With their insatiable appetites 
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for som tam, Thais stood to benefit from virus-resistant papaya developed across the 
Pacific, for Hawaiian growers.   
**** 
In 1978, when Hawaiian-born plant pathologist Dennis Gonsalves embarked 
on a mission to save his native state’s papaya industry from devastation by PRSV, 
words like “biotech” and “genetic engineering” were not part of the vernacular. A 
ukulele-picking virologist transplanted to Cornell University in upstate New York, 
Gonsalves was determined to use the tools of his trade to solve the problem of PRSV 
for Hawaiian farmers.  Gonsalves and his collaborators began embracing early forms 
of biotechnology to solve their problem in the late 1980s.  By 1992 there were 
sophisticated tools available to develop a genetically modified line that was resistant 
to the virus in field trials in Hawaii.   
Viruses are microscopic parasites that can’t reproduce on their own. If 
undetected, the plant inadvertently produces more of its own enemy.   Gonsalves’s 
approach was in effect to “vaccinate” the papaya by triggering its immune system with 
a gene that codes for the jacket of the virus—its protein coat.  Rather than inoculate 
each plant (which proved ineffective in the pre-GM era), they took advantage of the 
plant’s natural surveillance system, which detects viral genes that invade plant cells.  
By transferring a piece of viral DNA  into the plant genome, scientists give plants a 
heads–up to watch out for the real virus.   
Gonsalves and his team transferred a virus coat gene into the plant, giving it 
built-in immunity.  By the mid-1990s the industry was saved.  Now, roughly 80% of 
Hawaii’s papaya crop is GM.  Hawaiian farmers would grow more, but Japan, 
Hawaii’s most significant importer of papaya, has not approved import of most GM 
foods, so some papaya farmers must grow non-GM papaya to meet this market’s 
demands.  Growing non-GM papaya on the island is risky, however, and papaya 
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exporters have to offer incentives such as deals on land leases, to convince farmers to 
run the risk of losing everything.  Even then, the non-GM harvest is only possible 
because of the presence of the protected GM papaya, which lowers the amount of 
virus thriving on the island.  The Hawaiian papaya farmer grower association, HPIA, 
regulates and distributes the GM seed, keeping it in the hands of those who need it 
most. 
Gonsalves’s success was significant.  The federal approval process and farmer 
adoption were rapid, likely due to fortunate timing.  The product was commercialized 
just a few years before the debate around genetic engineering mushroomed in Europe.  
More than ten years later, GM papaya remains the only commercially available 
genetically modified food produced by university researchers, with public funds, 
specifically with small-scale farmers in mind.  No big money, no big business, just a 
few driven scientists satisfied to see their science have a social impact.   So it comes as 
no surprise that after the industry in Hawaii was saved, virologists from around the 
world came knocking on Gonsalves' door, looking to replicate his success in their own 
countries. Vilia Prasartsee, a plant virologist native to Isaan, was already collaborating 
with Gonsalves on the PRSV problem and was one of the first. 
Prasartsee, now the director of the Khon Kaen Plant Material and Technical 
Service Center for the Thai Department of Agriculture (DOA), is petite, humble, and 
practical.  Her station is a lush outpost just south of the provincial capital and roughly 
80 kilometers north of Mae Somkhuan's village.  When she came to the station in the 
late 1970s, she was charged with finding a means to control the papaya ringspot virus 
that was first observed in Thailand a few years earlier.  Prasartsee forged a 
collaboration with Gonsalves in 1981, employing non-transgenic approaches to 
control the virus.  They had little success.  So when Gonsalves’s group finally made 
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headway back in Hawaii with GM papaya, Prasartsee moved quickly to get on the 
bandwagon.   
Her first challenge was that the papaya varieties grown in Hawaii would not 
fare well in Thailand.  The sweet, yellow-fleshed, palm-sized Hawaiian varieties are 
neither adapted to Thai growing conditions, nor acceptable to Thai consumers who 
look for large zucchini-shaped varieties bred for som tam.  Thai researchers had to 
transform their own locally-adapted papaya varieties with the virus coat gene they 
isolated from a Thai virus strain.   In 1995, with modest funds from the Thai Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives and USAID, Prasartsee arranged for two of her 
colleagues to go to the Gonsalves laboratory at Cornell to create a transgenic, virus-
resistant papaya.  They brought with them isolates of PRSV from Thailand and their 
own papaya material to transform.  Two years later, they had successfully transformed 
two Thai-preferred papaya varieties and returned home. Gonsalves followed, the 
transformed plants in tow.  Standing in front of the steps of a Thai Airways plane on 
the tarmac in Khon Kaen, he and his wife Carol paused to pose for a snapshot with 
four of their Thai collaborators.  Beaming, they each held a well-wrapped resistant 
papaya plant for Thailand.  For Gonsalves, it was a career-high moment.  After years 
of collaboration, they would deliver to Prasartsee the plant that could save Thai 
farmers from ruin.  
From 1997 until 2004, Prasartsee and her crew worked rigorously to continue 
breeding the promising lines.  Other Thai scientists came on board to run the lines 
through the requisite gamut of tests.  Things were looking promising.  Third 
generation showed 97% to 100% resistance to the virus, and extensive health and 
biosafety testing weren’t turning up any negative effects on human health or the 
environment—no real surprise since the Hawaiian team had already found the same 
thing.  In order to commercialize GM papaya for Hawaii, Gonsalves and his team had 
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submitted evidence of safety to US regulatory agencies: the Animal Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  The US agencies unanimously approved the 
product as safe. Thailand was poised to become the first country in the developing 
world to deploy a genetically modified crop for its own subsistence farmers.  And 
what better place than where papaya is king and disease rates were soaring?  In June 
of 2004, Prasartsee’s confined field trials were yielding positive data and the trees 
were amass with virus-free fruit. She was eager to move to farmer field trials—a final 
step before releasing the seed to farmers.  
Then Greenpeace showed up. Greenpeace, an international organization once 
known for its stands against whaling and nuclear testing, had a new target on its radar: 
GM  plants.  The activists made their statement with signature Greenpeace artistry.  
Dressed in white hooded personal protection suits, they travelled to Khon Kaen from 
Bangkok and used a ladder to climb over the barbed wire fence that contained 
Prasartsee’s experimental GM papaya at the Thai DOA station.  They were not alone.  
They had alerted reporters from newspapers and local television stations, who 
captured their every move.  Gloved hands transferred transgenic fruit from healthy 
trees into biohazardous waste bins.  Other activists held large yellow banners that read, 
in both Thai and English, “Stop GMO Field Trials.”  When Prasartsee and her co-
workers at the DOA were alerted by security, they ran to the scene.  They were met by 
leaders of the Thai Greenpeace anti-GM campaign who had some messages to deliver:  
A written charge that the Thai DOA had negligently distributed GM papaya beyond 
the confines of the field trial, and evidence that they had obtained genetically modified 
material from farmers’ fields in 37 provinces around Thailand.  One of those fields 
was that of Mae Somkhuan. 
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How transgenic seeds got out of the confined field trials and into backyards 
throughout Thailand is still an open question.  Likely, there is more than one answer.  
Informal interviews with farmers living in villages around the station indicate that 
field laborers hired by the research station had sticky fingers.   They had easy access to 
GM papaya that looked better than any trees they had seen in decades.   It’s likely that 
some of these workers brought fruit or seeds out of the station for their own home use.  
Several villagers claimed to have obtained seed from relatives who worked at the 
station- though the seed came with frightening, though untrue, disclaimers that 
consumption of the illegal papaya would cause sterility or even cancer.  But those 
irrational notions, it seems, were largely disregarded.  Villagers ate the papaya anyway 
and claimed it was delicious. Many kept the seed from the high quality fruit, hoping to 
have papaya in the backyard again the following year. 
Also plausible is the scenario in which seed from the transgenic fruit may have 
gotten mixed in with the non-transgenic seed that the station distributes.  Still others 
claim that Greenpeace activists themselves may have stolen and dispersed the seed as 
part of their strategy to discredit the government.  One activist did purchase nominally 
non-transgenic seed from Prasartsee and subjected it to genetic tests that turned up 
positive for transgenes.  However, Prasartsee claims that the grams purchased were 
fewer than the grams of seed submitted for testing—leaving conspiracy theorists 
fodder to think that stolen GM seed may have been added to the purchased seed that 
was tested.   
Regardless, it is clear that the GM seed did get out of the research station.  
Identifying transgenic trees is not a difficult task—one only has to look for signs of 
healthy productive trees amongst the PRSV-affected carnage.  Chances are that any 
mature tree in Thailand that looks healthy is transgenic.  Following the Greenpeace 
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charge, the DOA complied with orders from above and made village sweeps 
eradicating any trees suspected to be transgenic. 
**** 
Mae could have expected her papaya crop to fail for a number of reasons.  The 
papaya ringspot virus, which is ruthless in her region, devastates as much as 99% of a 
crop.   Too much—or more likely, too little—rain, insect infestation, or any number of 
the stealth fungi that prey on papaya could have accounted for her loss.  The 
livelihood of a farmer hangs by a thin string.  What she did not expect was that a 
group of young urbanites fearing corporate take-over would set into motion the 
downward spiral of her entrepreneurial efforts. 
Eager to learn of new farming opportunities and to rub shoulders with people 
with clout, Mae often opened her farm up to university agents and other interested 
visitors.  Although their name did not mean much to her at first, referencing her farm 
guestbook, she concludes that Greenpeace affiliates made the trip to her farm a few 
times before the GM raid.   According to Mae, on the first visit they came to look at 
her papaya and only asked why she had so many productive and healthy looking trees. 
On subsequent visits things started to get sticky. 
While Prasartsee was witnessing the ruin of her most significant scientific 
work—caught emotionally unguarded in tears on Thai television—Mae was in Khon 
Kaen participating in a som tam contest.  She arrived home later that day to find a 
group of unexpected visitors asking for a tour of her orchard.  Compliant and 
welcoming, she and her eldest son showed them her papaya.  She did not yet know of 
the events that had transpired at Prasartsee’s research station.  By the following day, 
when members of the group returned, she did.  And she was confused when they came 
to take sacks of her papaya and to inform her that she had GM papaya that could, in 
their words, “contaminate” other trees.  For such a crime, she recalls being told, she 
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could be detained and charged.  What Greenpeace didn’t take with them, Mae 
Somkhuan says, was ruined soon after.  The village chief, with whom Mae Somkhuan 
had previous conflicts, seized the opportunity to publicly ridicule her.  With backing 
from the district sheriff, he began a quick campaign against Mae Somkhuan and her 
papaya. According to Mae, the campaign involved posters around the village that 
claimed her papaya was “Dracula” and that anyone who ate it would die.  Day laborers 
from a nearby village were employed to help destroy her crop with the promise that 
they would also get some information about how to raise cattle.   
The Greenpeace-inspired raids in Khon Kaen changed the course of adoption 
of all GM crops in Thailand.  It changed the course of Mae Somkhuan’s plan to 
become a papaya entrepreneur. Gonsalves and Prasartsee, once seen as scientific 
saviors, were re-construed by the media as corporate demons.  This recasting has 
nearly cut off subsistence-level Thai farmers from their daily dish of som tam.   
Back in Bangkok, Greenpeace’s anti-GM team congratulated themselves after 
spending several months planning the events that transpired in Khon Kaen. Jiragorn 
Gajaseni, the Director of Greenpeace Southeast Asia (GPSEA) from 2000 to 2004, 
calls the campaign against GM papaya one of the “highlights of GPSEA”—the events 
in Khon Kaen, the climax.  Determining how and where to hit were tactical.  The most 
fundamental decisions, like what campaigns to pursue, are matters of strategy and 
politics in the organization.   
Genetic modification became one of the issues the Southeast Asia franchise 
served up from Greenpeace International’s palette of campaign options based on a sort 
of popularity contest.  According to Gajaseni, if there is a campaign that is bringing in 
support and having success, more investment goes into it, and less emphasis is put on 
others.   Early on, the office dropped the Greenpeace campaign to protect forests, 
which they saw as unattainable dead end, and bolstered the anti-GM campaign—a hot 
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topic globally when the Southeast Asia office set up in Bangkok around the year 2000.  
People in Bangkok could relate to food, and it was increasingly an issue in Europe, 
home of the Greenpeace mother ship.  And although 90% of the GPSEA office’s 
budget comes from Greenpeace International, it is highly dependent on contributions 
from the Bangkok elite—an elite that is increasingly responsive to European food 
trends.  The anti-GM fad was no exception. 
So why papaya?  If there is a best-case scenario for biotech, it is the virus-
resistant papaya.  Not all GMOs are the same and each should be evaluated on a case-
by-case basis.  The GM papaya is hard to beat.  Developed by the public sector and 
supported by the Thai government, it is a domestic undertaking meant to benefit 
small-scale farmers.  The complaints of Greenpeace and others about corporate seed 
control do not apply in this case.  All the evidence points to complete environmental 
and health safety.  Papaya produced in Thailand is consumed mostly at home, with 
10% or less used for canned fruit salad bound primarily for Europe.  And with the 
virus moving swiftly through even the most remote growing areas, it’s hard to imagine 
why not GM papaya for Thai farmers? 
“Papaya is nothing,” Gajaseni says.  “GMO papaya is not an end by itself.  It is 
a means – a biotechnology push to open the door for a bigger crop, and rice is the 
target.”  This, he says, is the reason why multinationals such as Monsanto have gotten 
behind the papaya case, despite having little to directly gain from it.  It is the farmer-
friendly good-will case for biotech. It’s hard to argue against and it stands up to 
rational anti-GM arguments. But Greenpeace fears that if pro-GM lobbyists in 
Bangkok can push the papaya through, other crops may follow.   “And that is rice.”  
Gajaseni says flatly, raising his eyebrows.  
The anti-GM activists and the pro-GM multinationals quickly figured this out, 
but the researchers who developed the papaya had not anticipated that the application 
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of their science would go sour due to politics. Gonsalves wised up and became 
politically active, speaking to ministers, farmer groups and anyone else with ears to 
hear the tale of his success in Hawaii and hopes for farmers in less fortunate places.  
Prasartsee has followed suit, joining forces with pro-GM Thai NGOs and lobbyists 
that are pushing the ministries to overturn the 2004 ruling that followed the 
Greenpeace protest at her station and banned farmer field trials in Thailand—a 
necessary step toward commercialization and distribution to farmers.  
Greenpeace SE Asia’s anti-GM campaign organizers hold fast to the belief that 
technology that is not Thai—including GM papaya—is not good for Thailand.  
Although their claims that the papaya is not proven safe for the environment and 
human consumption can be challenged and refuted by biologists, social and economic 
arguments are harder to resolve.  The Biotechnology Alliance Association (BAA), a 
pro-GM NGO in Bangkok, estimates that if GM papaya was deployed and papaya 
production returned to peak levels, production could increase by 471%, bringing along 
an economic benefit to Thailand of $880,000,000 USD over a ten-year adoption 
period.  A failure to adopt the technology, the BAA asserts, will threaten Thailand’s 
economic competitiveness with other Asian countries.  But Greenpeace does not feel 
bullied by Thailand’s Chinese and Vietnamese neighbors who are investing heavily in 
the technology.  They foresee Thailand filling niche markets of high quality, 
organically-produced, non-GM foods that will satisfy the palettes of Europeans and 
the discriminating Bangkok elite.  But it isn’t clear how their low-tech practices will 
actually help papaya farmers combat the virus at hand—a virus for which there is no 
other known means of control.  And since papaya does not interbreed with any other 
crop, why not allow GM papaya as an exception? 
Since the tit for tat actions that began in 2004, the ensuing debate has almost 
exclusively taken place in Bangkok, largely ignoring small farmers like Mae 
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Somkhuan.   The battleground has become the Thai court system, as Greenpeace 
filed suit against the DOA, which in turn charged Greenpeace with theft and 
trespassing.  Greenpeace was acquitted in September 2006.  This came as a surprise to 
Prasartsee and her colleagues, whose plants were destroyed by the 2004 protest. “The 
court ruled that there was no evidence that those two Greenpeace activists got into the 
experimental field,” Prasartsee wrote the morning the Bangkok Post reported the 
ruling.  This was hard for her to swallow, considering the revealing photos that were 
published in Bangkok daily papers, two years prior.  “I realized that my attempts to 
help the poor in this country came to their end today,” she sadly surmised. 
Four days after the courts acquitted the Greenpeace activists, Thailand 
experienced a relatively clean military coup d'état that replaced the decidedly corrupt 
Thaksin government with an interim government.  The pro-GM contingency in 
Bangkok had a little more than a year to take advantage of a relatively sympathetic 
group of military-appointed interim ministers who were more academically-minded 
than politically motivated.  Leading the charge among them was the then-minster of 
agriculture Thira Sutabutra, a PhD plant virologist confident that Thailand needs GM 
papaya.  His periodic efforts throughout 2007 to get the ban on field trials lifted were 
thwarted at each step by Greenpeace activities with ample media appeal.  The most 
significant of these efforts occurred in August 2007, when word on the street was that 
Thira had built up support from fellow ministers to overturn the ban on field trials and 
was ready to make a move within the cabinet.  When he stepped outside his ministry 
on August 28th, however, Greenpeace had left ten metric tons of papaya on his 
doorstep with a sign that read: “GMO?”  The item was tabled by the cabinet to avoid 
further controversy, but the activity was widely reported as having “backfired” since 
folks stuck in Bangkok traffic rushed out to pilfer the protested papaya piled up 
outside of the ministry, despite the (untrue) suggestion that it was transgenic.   
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With only three months left in his interim post as minister, Thira made his final push 
in December, only to be countered by the same familiar faces.  This time, the outcome 
was less clear.  Technically, the old ban was lifted, but it was replaced with a 
compromise resolution so strict that it is next to impossible to advance any GM 
initiatives.  Neither party was happy.  Dead heat. 
**** 
The sun radiates ruthlessly from its daily zenith—the reliable indicator that it’s 
lunchtime.  Five field workers piled into a dilapidated Isuzu pickup tumble down the 
dirt lane to the cooperative headquarters—a cinderblock shed just big enough for Mae 
Somkhuan’s bed, a refrigerator, and a wardrobe.  Above the fluorescent light fixture 
hangs a scrap of a plastic bag coated with used cooking oil, a cheap method of fly 
control.  Most of the cooking happens on a cement slab outside of the house; the 
dining, in the yard.  The laborers situate themselves cross-legged in a circle on a large 
wooden platform, a versatile and typical piece of Isaan furniture.  Each has brought his 
own small basket of sticky rice, while the rest of the lunch items—som tam, fried 
crickets, and beef jerky that Mae Somkhuan dries by hanging the strips over the 
barbed wire fence behind her shed—are served family style in the middle.  Large 
browned hands roll small balls of sticky rice—an edible alternative to flatware—to 
pick up spicy bites of som tam.   “Spicy enough?” Mae asks a man called Hok (six)- 
so-named for his split thumb.  “Spice is good,” he replies, sucking in air for relief. 
Mae grunts a guttural “uuh” that, in Isaan-speak, signifies a satisfactory affirmative. 
That’s the answer she was looking for.  The conversation, as it often does, turns to 
karaoke.  They are rigging up a system. I will sing ballads in transliterated Thai 
tonight. 
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Although Mae and her farmers aren’t without their occasional lunchtime som 
tam, they have turned to other means to support their families—spinning silk, raising 
cattle, and sending their sons and daughters to serve foreign tourists in faraway Thai 
beach towns. The papaya disease epidemic is not a complete catastrophe.  There are 
still pockets of productive papaya plantations in remote regions in central Thailand or 
butting up against the Myanmar border.  But those large-scale papaya producers will 
not be able to out-run the virus for long.  As domestic production continues to decline 
and the price of papaya soars, Thailand will be faced with no other option than to 
import papaya from its neighbors—countries like China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, 
which are all moving toward producing GM papaya to control the virus in their own 
backyards.  If the Thai government chooses to follow a trajectory of Luddites, it may 
soon be importing GM papaya, with tails tucked between their legs.   
Back in Bangkok, advocates for this technology continue to push the cabinet to 
allow Thailand to resume a regionally competitive position in their agricultural sector 
through biotechnology.  But those balancing a more delicate livelihood—Isaan 
villagers—have had to move on.  Buffeted but not broken, Mae has turned to other 
endeavors to pull herself out of debt and pay off the loans she took out to grow 
papaya.  Perhaps tragically hip to global trends, she and her co-op members boarded 
the biofuels bandwagon, and are now growing sweet sorghum to sell the syrup to the 
local ethanol plant. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
POWER, PROGRESS, AND PREVARICATION:  LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND GE 
PAPAYA IN THAILAND 
 
Primary Research 
This following article is an example of technical writing for the primary literature.  
Reported within are the results of a qualitative survey of small-scale farmers in 
Thailand and their perceptions and knowledge of genetically engineered papaya.  It is 
an example of a primary research article and will be submitted to the journal 
Agriculture and Human Values for review. 
 
Introduction 
The controversy around genetically engineered (GE) papaya in Thailand is a 
particularly interesting case in light of the debate regarding genetic engineering.  The 
GE papaya was developed in the 1990s specifically to improve the livelihoods of 
small farmers.  Yet, these farmers have been excluded from the discourse.  In this case 
study I report on farmer knowledge of agricultural biotechnology and genetically 
engineered papaya in northeast Thailand. 
In 2006, half of the 22 countries growing biotech (genetically engineered) 
crops were developing nations—most of them quickly industrializing nations such as 
China, Brazil, India and Mexico (James, 2008). By 2008, three additional countries 
grew biotech crops, all of which were developing countries.  For the first time, the 
number of developing countries growing biotech crops outnumbered industrialized 
nations, 15:10 (James, 2008). Yet, in much of the developing world, genetically 
engineered crops remain a contentious issue.  The decision to grow biotech crops is 
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dominated by a country’s degree of economic servitude to richer nations, available 
infrastructure, and trained manpower. 
Thailand invested heavily in using the tools of biotechnology to bolster their 
agricultural sector early on.  The Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology 
was established in 1983, and is currently housed under the Ministry of Science 
(Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007). The government created training programs for Thai 
scientists to study abroad from 1990. Thailand was a regional leader; it was the first 
country in its region to draft National Biosafety Guidelines and the first to approve 
field testing of GE crops (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  In-country projects were 
underway as early as 1985 to improve a number of crops including tomato, chili 
pepper and papaya (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  However, many neighboring 
countries have surpassed Thailand since a 2001 ban on open field trials was put into 
place, following strong pressure by anti-GE opposition groups.  The cabinet and the 
country as a whole remain polarized on the issue (Davidson, 2008).  While elite 
stakeholders continue to debate the issue in Bangkok, there is little engagement with 
the farmers who were the intended beneficiaries of the technology. 
The case that progressed the furthest towards commercialization is that of 
virus-resistant GE papaya (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  Three independent parallel 
projects were undertaken by researchers at Mahidol University, Kasetsart University 
and by the Thai Department of Agriculture (Davidson, 2006).  The latter project came 
closest to commercialization when all field trials (open and confined) were banned in 
the country in 2004 (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  GE papaya is at the center of the 
controversy in Thailand, due to the advanced stages of R&D and its wide popularity 
and status as a “food of the people”—particularly in the agricultural region of Isaan in 
the northeast quadrant of the country. 
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Virus-resistant papaya stood to benefit not only large-scale growers combating 
the virus in orchard settings, but the small-scale, resource-poor farmers it was 
designed for (Gonsalves, 2007). The genetic modification is small and benign.  The 
response of the genetically engineered plant is analogous to the response of the human 
immune system following vaccination.  When a gene from a virus is inserted into a 
plant, the plant detects its product as foreign and shuts down expression of the gene.  
In developing GE, virus-resistant papaya, researchers isolated the coat protein gene 
specific for a Thai strain of the virus and transformed it into papaya cells, which were 
then regenerated into seedlings.  The resistant seedlings were then reared into mature 
trees.  In confined field trials at the Thai DOA field station, third generation transgenic 
plants developed by the Thai DOA researchers and their collaborators showed 97-
100% resistance to the unruly virus, for which there are no other feasible means of 
control (Sakuanrungsirikul et al., 2004).  The trait is heritable by subsequent 
generations, rendering it a sustainable solution to the country’s epidemic (Thitiprasert, 
2003). Virus resistant papaya does not produce viral proteins, but rather shuts down 
their production.  Therefore, GE, virus-resistant papaya has fewer virus particles than 
non-GE papaya, which serve as hosts for virus populations (MacDiarmid, 2007).  
Lastly, virus-resistant papaya has been grown in Hawaii for over ten years and 
consumed in North America, with no negative ecological or health effects (Gonsalves, 
2007).  Studies conducted by the Thai DOA produced similar results.  No negative 
effects were found on soil containing GE trees, on insect populations studied or on 
mammalian health as measured in rat feeding studies (Thitiprasert, 2003). 
Thailand has fewer obstacles to adopting genetically modified crops.  This is 
due to their early investment in capacity building (both technical resources and 
manpower) and in the case of the papaya, little is exported, alleviating economic 
pressure from importing countries such as those of Europe (Sriwatanapongse et al., 
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2007).  Over ninety percent of papaya produced in Thailand is consumed domestically 
(Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  The remainder is mostly used as a component of 
canned fruit salad that is largely exported to China and Europe. 
Papaya is a staple food throughout Thailand, but holds particular significance 
in rural communities, where it is the primary food for field laborers 
(Sakuanrungsirikul et al., 2004).  In the agricultural northeast, papaya is grown by 
backyard subsistence farmers for daily consumption, rather than by large-scale 
farmers, as in other regions of the country.  Trees are kept in backyard gardens and 
peripheral to paddy fields.  It is most often consumed in unripe form as the primary 
ingredient in “som tam” or green papaya salad, the most common accompaniment to 
the rice-dominated diet.  Ripe papaya is rich in vitamin C and pro-vitamin A 
carotenoids, and both ripe and unripe forms have been attributed with health benefits 
such as aiding in digestion (Duxbury, 2003).  Papaya also holds significance in the 
animist and Buddhist religious ceremonies of the northeast and is an important menu 
item in traditional festivities such as weddings and funerals. 
However, since the mid-1970s papaya in Thailand has suffered from the 
papaya ringspot virus (PRSV) (Thitiprasert, 2003).  The virus was first observed in the 
northeast, but has since spread throughout the country, severely affecting papaya 
production.  Infected trees develop a range of symptoms.  Leaves turn yellow, limiting 
their ability to photosynthesize, and young leaves are distorted and small.  Ring spots 
appear on malformed fruits, productivity of the trees is compromised, and eventually 
the trees die (Gonsalves, 1998).  The impact of the disease on subsistence farmers is 
significant.  Farmers can no longer grow their own fruit and may not have the means 
to purchase fruit in the local markets, where papaya produced by larger growers in the 
central region of the country is sold (Vilai Prasartsee, personal communication). 
Larger farmers also struggle with the virus, often moving their plantations to un-
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developed regions where the virus has not yet occurred.  This is a short-term solution 
as the virus usually appears within 3-5 years after papaya is introduced (Vilai 
Prasartsee, personal communication). 
In 2004, when all trials of genetically engineered crops came to a standstill, the 
GE PRSV-resistant papaya was in the final stages of testing (Sakuanrungsirikul et al., 
2004).  Currently, Thailand is at an important juncture in deciding whether to allow 
cultivation of GE crops in the country. In favor are large-scale farmers, members of 
the foreign seed sector, and agencies under the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives and the Ministry of Science.  Opposition stems largely from anti-GE 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the multinational Greenpeace 
International as well as domestic NGOs such as BioThai (Davidson, 2008).  
Proponents argue that GE crops will bolster the agricultural sector, allowing Thailand 
to compete with neighboring countries such as Vietnam and China who have moved 
forward with the technology (Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  Opponents argue that 
adoption of GE crops will threaten the livelihoods of small-scale farmers, Thailand’s 
GMO-free status, and Thailand’s ability to export to European consumers who favor 
non-GE food (Greenpeace International, 2003).  All stakeholders consider papaya to 
be a potential gateway for other GE crops—the most controversial is that of which is 
rice (Davidson, 2008).  Left out of the debate are the small-scale farmers who, some 
argue, have the most to gain from the technology.  Others argue they have the most to 
lose.   
When GE crops first emerged in the 1990s, the debate between proponents and 
critics of the technology focused on scientifically testable risks associated with the 
technologies (Guehlstorf, 2008).  Debates have been dominated by environmentalists, 
scientists, policy makers and regulators (MacDiarmid, 2007).  Absent from the debate 
even in countries where GM crops have been grown the longest (in the US), are the 
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voices of farmers who are the direct users of the technologies (Guehlstorf, 2008).  
Previous studies of farmers in industrialized countries suggest that farmers' decisions 
about whether or not to adopt GE crops extend beyond economic considerations.  
Their practical knowledge of agricultural challenges faced in the field may help to 
resolve disputes between stakeholders who are removed from participating directly in 
agriculture but are heavily engaged in the debate.  These include scientists, policy 
makers and environmental activists.  Guehlstorf (2008) asserts that farmer adoption of 
GE crops is heavily influenced by social and environmental variables that are not fully 
rational.  In addition he hypothesized that farmer perception of risk can be mitigated 
by scientific information from trusted institutions such as government or university 
researchers. 
Biotechnology crops that most stand to benefit small-scale farmers in the 
developing world are those that fill three criteria suggested by Edmeades and Smale 
(2006) and consistent with studies of technology diffusion (Rogers, 2003).  They 
should resolve an important biotic or abiotic challenge; should not affect trade through 
exports to countries that do not accept GE products; and should serve not only as a 
potential source of income, but most importantly, as a source of food (Edmeades and 
Smale, 2006).  The case of GE papaya in Thailand satisfies these criteria for adoption 
by small-scale farmers.  The modification renders the papaya resistant to a devastating 
virus for which there is no other means of control.  Papaya is primarily consumed at 
home, with less than 10% exported as canned fruit salad to the EU and China.  Small-
scale farmers consume papaya at home, in the field, and offer it to village celebrations, 
with a small proportion traded locally for goods or services. 
Despite their important position as primary food producers for Thailand, little 
is known about small-scale farmers’ understanding of biotechnology, their perceptions 
of the technology, and whether or not they are likely to adopt the technology, if it 
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became available.   In this study, I address the following research questions that 
emerge regarding this particular stakeholder group:  (1) What do farmers know about 
GE papaya in the context of agricultural biotechnology as a whole?  (2) What are their 
perceptions of the technology in the context of local knowledge?  (3) Are they likely 
to adopt the technology?  
 
Study Sites and Methods 
I chose four study sites in the northeast quadrant of Thailand (the Isaan region) for this 
study.  Selection was based on two factors: proximity to the DOA field station where 
field trials were conducted until 2004, and availability of existing data collected by the 
Thai DOA on disease occurrence in 1988 and 2006.  Two of the four villages surveyed 
are close to the DOA field station and residents often related or acquainted to those 
who were employed there as field workers.  Thus, I expected that they would have a 
greater knowledge of the GE and the GE papaya.  The other two villages were further 
from the research station and had less local exposure to the station’s ongoing projects.  
All four villages are in the heart of the Isaan region where papaya is an important 
staple food.   
Forty farmers in four villages were surveyed with regard to their knowledge 
and perceptions of GE papaya.  The villages are listed in Table 1.  All were small 
villages with 100 households or less.  A standard survey (see Appendix) was the basis 
for each of the interviews, which lasted from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. I did not impose 
a pre-planned sampling frame, but benefited from an informal approach that was 
effective in other studies of farmer perception of GE crops in developing countries 
(Herring, 2008).  Often, while I was interviewing one farmer, neighbors and other 
field workers began to congregate and participate in the discussion, undermining the 
utility of a formal farmer selection process.  Thus, although some numbers were 
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recorded for responses given by the farmer we (my interpreter and I) first engaged, 
they represent only a suggestive small sample, and are not meant to be statistically 
significant.  I recognize the limitations of the data collected in this survey.  The 
responses published here are meant to serve only as a preliminary basis from which 
subsequent studies may benefit. 
 I composed the survey in English.  An interpreter then translated it into Thai.  
Although I was present for all of the interviews, the surveys were conducted by a 
native Thai speaker who translated the survey responses into English for my analysis.  
Each respondent was asked each of the survey questions, many of which were open-
ended questions allowing the interviewee to expound on their responses. Responses 
were documented on the survey forms and were also voice recorded. My interpretation 
of the results was informed by a seven-month immersion experience living with a 
papaya farmer in village similar to those surveyed.  Questions with discreet responses 
are tallied in tables.  Open-ended questions were subjected to grounded theory analysis 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), from which three themes emerged. 
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Table 1.  Forty farmers in four villages (ten farmers per village) were surveyed 
regarding their knowledge and perceptions of genetically engineered (GE) papaya. 
Villages were selected based on their size (100 households or less) and their proximity 
to the DOA station.  In addition, for these villages infection data exists that were 
collected by the Thai Department of Agriculture in previous years. 
 
% 
infection 
% 
infection  
1988 
DOA 
2006 
DOA 
Village No. 
Households 
    
Number 
of papaya 
trees per 
household 
Households 
reporting 
trees with 
PRSV 
symptoms 
Hlub Ya 
Kah 
(near) 
71 N/a 92% 9 100% 
Tha Rae 
(near) 
93 42% 96% 12 90% 
Muan Ae 
(far) 
100 45% N/a 32 90% 
King 
Kaeng 
(far) 
100 75% N/a 12 100% 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
The results from a selection of the questions are tallied in Table 2.  From these 
responses, the following can be surmised:  (1) Farmers vary in their understanding of 
traditional breeding approaches, but almost unanimously approve of it.  (2) Far fewer 
farmers have heard the technical Thai term for genetic engineering, but once the 
technique is explained, most expressed approval of the technology.  (3) Despite their 
lack of understanding of genetic engineering techniques, when asked if they would 
plant GE papaya if it were resistant to the virus, the majority of farmers in all four 
villages said they would.  (4) Most farmers were willing to pay for papaya seed, 
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though the amount they stated they would pay usually did not differ between GE and 
non-GE seed.  The most informative aspects of the survey emerged from responses to 
open-ended questions. A qualitative grounded theory approach was employed to 
understand their responses, from which three themes emerged.  I categorized these as 
progress (defined as economic success), power and prevarication.   
 
Table 2. Forty farmers in four villages (ten farmers per village) were surveyed 
regarding their knowledge and perceptions and approval of traditional plant breeding 
techniques and genetically engineering, in reference to genetically engineered papaya. 
 
Village 
 
Heard of 
cross 
breeding 
Approve 
of cross 
breeding 
Heard of 
genetic 
engineering? 
Approve of 
genetic 
engineering 
Would 
plant 
GE 
papaya 
Hlub Ya 
Kah 
(near) 
30% 100% 10% 50% yes 
40% unsure 
70% yes 
30% 
unsure 
Tha Rae 
(near) 
60% 100% 40% 100% yes 100% 
yes 
Muan Ae 
(far) 
40% 90% 30% 90% yes 
10% unsure 
90% yes 
10% 
unsure 
King 
Kaeng 
(far) 
100% 88% 40% 100% yes 100% 
yes 
 
Progress 
Although few farmers admitted any knowledge of what GE or biotechnology entail 
and even fewer had scientifically accurate knowledge, farmers interviewed were 
nonetheless enthusiastic about the prospects of GE technology, once the techniques 
were explained.  Just as one may associate the word “Bangkok” with “traffic” or “the 
King’s Palace,” we asked farmers to indicate what they associate with the term 
“genetic engineering.”  Although some farmers had no basis on which to associate the 
words “genetic engineering” and declined to respond, those who did word-associate 
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with the term associated it with terms related to progress.  These fall into two 
categories: technological progress and economic progress. 
The comment, “It is not wrong because it is the new thing.  The method is 
charitable to someone who has problems and technology can solve their problems” is 
indicative of the sentiment farmers showed toward the technology.  Comments 
associated with technological progress included: 
• “Information, explorer and improvement.” 
• “Research, scientists” 
• “Development” 
• “Progress” 
• “Modern technology” 
• “Faster development” 
 
Comments associated with economic progress included: 
• “It will stimulate me to work harder.” 
• “Economic sufficiency” 
• “Earn Money” 
• “Reduced costs” 
• "Higher yield” 
• “No chemical applications” 
• "Faster growing” 
• "Increased fruit size” 
All of these comments suggest a positive response to the economic benefits of a 
virus-resistant papaya and a likelihood of adoption. 
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Power 
Although Thai society is not based on a caste system, its members are responsive to a 
social hierarchy based on education, age and socioeconomic status.  This dynamic is 
manifested in the language in which anyone perceived as of higher status is addressed 
as “Khun.”  A farmer would address a college-educated teacher, elder or agricultural 
extension agent with title such as “Khun” or with more specific titles such as the Thai 
terms for Doctor or Professor.  In addition to the manner in which people of higher 
socioeconomic standings are addressed, farmers place value on the knowledge that 
higher-ups garner.  Respectful of their assumed increased knowledge base, farmers 
trust persons of higher socioeconomic standing.  Thus, when asked questions about 
whether they would adopt papaya seed technology that was GE, they indicated a 
willingness to do so if the authoritative figures that they trust approved the technology.  
Specifically, they exhibit general trust in the government and the agricultural officers 
working for the government.  In other cases, farmer perception of risk was mitigated 
by scientific information from trusted agencies such as government extension agents 
or university researchers (Guehlstorf, 2008). The following responses are consistent 
with this observation: 
• “If it was bad they wouldn’t generate it in the first place.” 
• “If it was shown to be safe.” 
• “If it is not illegal, it should be tested in farmers fields.” 
• “It should be approved by the government.  The government should allow 
research on it.” 
• “If the papaya wasn’t good, agricultural officers at Tha Pra would not have 
been testing it.” 
• “I take any seedlings that the officer tells me are a good variety.” 
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• “Agricultural officers are part of a governmental organization and they 
introduce good things to farmers.” 
 
However, the trust that farmers have in people in positions of power, are not one-
sided.  They also have demands for people in positions of power and expect that they 
will represent farmers and guide them in their decisions and economic opportunities.  
This notion is indicated by the following responses: 
• “Agricultural officers should come out to the field and give us advice and look 
after the farmers.” 
• “Whether I would adopt the technology depends on if an agricultural officer 
comes and shows it to me.” 
• “If someone comes and tells me about it, I might be richer than today.” 
• “Officers should find a way to solve the PRSV problem.” 
• “No one has come to introduce me to an example.” 
Together, these responses indicate a two-sided power dynamic between farmers 
with limited knowledge and those they regard as keepers of knowledge; balancing 
trust of power and their demands of people in positions of power. 
 
Prevarication 
During the period of field testing of GE papaya at the DOA field station, and 
following a large Greenpeace protest that was widely covered by the press over GE 
papaya, prevarications surrounding the safety of GE papaya spread throughout Isaan’s 
villages.  These falsehoods were spawned by several sources, with very different 
motives.   Prevarications on the effects of GE papaya on human health reported by 
farmers included: 
• infertility 
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• death 
• cancer 
• abortion 
• obesity 
 
In 2004 the Thai media coverage of GE papaya underwent a “hoopla effect’ 
following the Greenpeace protest in Tha Pra and their accusations that the Thai DOA 
released transgenic papaya from the research station (Xiang, 2007).  In a comparative 
analysis of media coverage of GE crops in China (GE rice), Thailand (GE papaya), 
and the US (GE rice and Papaya), Xiang (2007) found that the most negative attitudes 
toward GE crops were found in the Thai press, likely due to the intense use of ant-GE 
groups such as Greenpeace, as news sources.  He reported that American newspapers 
reporting on GE papaya were more likely than their media counterparts in Thailand to 
cite scientific journals, industry representatives and farmers.  In contrast, Thai 
newspapers overwhelmingly cited advocacy groups, while scientists were the least 
frequently cited (Xiang, 2007).  
According to survey responses, and as indicated in the above discussion on power, 
the farmers surveyed also relied on agricultural extension agents, such as those 
working at the DOA research station, for information on papaya and other agricultural 
products.  Many farmers reported hearing the prevarications above not only through 
media channels and anti-GE NGOs, but also from DOA workers.  Several local 
farmers that I spoke with reported that workers at the site of the confined field trials 
were discouraged from removing papaya from the station by such prevarications.  
Though the prevarications carried risks that were made explicitly known to farmers, 
they largely rejected them, as indicated by the following responses to the 
prevarications listed above: 
 120 
• “But I don’t believe it” 
• “It is an old belief.” 
• “I ate it anyway, and it was delicious.” 
• “I ate it anyway and nothing ever happened.” 
• “Papaya cannot cause cancer because it doesn’t require chemicals to grow.” 
 
Whether a prevarication circulates as truth or gets accepted may depend on 
whether it is rooted in pre-existing local knowledge.  For example, one farmer 
compared her risk perception of GE papaya with her beer consumption.  She said, “I 
drank a lot of beer and then someone told me that beer makes people fat.  But it won’t 
happen to me.”  A petite, middle-age woman to whom beer consumption is not a new 
phenomenon, she rejected the notion that beer will make her fat because it is outside 
of her experience as a slender beer drinker.  Farmers explain phenomena on the basis 
of observations rooted in their experience.   
This is supported by their explanations of what causes the symptoms of papaya 
ringspot virus.  Farmers did not attribute the disease symptoms to the virus itself, 
about which most were unaware, but had alternative explanations that related to their 
real world experience.  Some suggested  “contact with smoke” as a cause.  After the 
rice harvest, paddy fields are burned producing smoke that many farmers thought may 
be the cause of the disease symptoms.  Others attributed it to smoke from charcoal 
production, a cottage enterprise undertaken by many small-scale farmers.  Still others 
attributed it to air pollution or “artificial” rain through cloud seeding—a common 
practice in Thailand. 
The survey responses indicate that prevarications on health effects are being 
rejected.  This may be explained by a lack of evidence of negative health effects in 
their experience or by a greater perceived benefit of GE papaya.  The case of insect 
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resistance (Bt) cotton in India provides a precedent for the latter (Herring, 2007).  
Small-scale farmers perceived a benefit of growing the crop despite that it was not 
legal in the country and there were widespread prevarications on risk of adopting the 
technology.  Clearly the farmers saw the benefit of adopting the technology as 
outweighing unknown risks.  Human societies are not risk societies;  but they are 
benefit-driven.  If perceived benefits outweigh risks, as has been the case in medical 
biotechnology, people are willing to embrace technology (Paarlberg, 2008).  In the 
case of agricultural biotechnology, the consumers and policy makers protesting the 
technology and in many cases, promoting prevarications about the technology, come 
from rich countries and are disengaged from agriculture (Paarlberg, 2008).  Food-
secure, they perceive no benefit. In contrast, prevarications manifested as unknown 
risks are rejected by farmers who perceive agricultural biotechnology as bearing 
greater benefits. 
The success of a newly introduced idea (such as the prevarications on GE papaya) 
is affected by the old idea that it supersedes (Rogers, 2003).  In this case, the 
prevarications spread about papaya were not consistent with the old ideas about 
papaya as a nutritious food source.   Most farmer responses suggest that prevarications 
are being rejected because they contradict the established notion of papaya as 
sustenance—established local knowledge that is consistent with experience.  However, 
if agents (both pro and anti) hold power, it is curious that the prevarications they 
perpetuated were rejected by relatively uneducated farmers.  The perceived benefit of 
GE papaya as a boon to their household economics and their personal experience as 
papaya consumers seems to trump their regard for advice by external agents.  That is 
to say, the promise of economic progress appears to over-ride prevarications spread by 
those with power.  Progress trumps power and prevarication in their evaluation of 
perceived risks and benefits (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1.  The responses from this survey suggest that local knowledge is influenced 
by existing local knowledge, economic progress, prevarications, and knowledge from 
high status sources (power).  However, an emphasis on economic progress dominates 
their experience and influences their revised local knowledge.    
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The responses of small-scale Isaan farmers provide a new perspective on the 
debate over GE virus-resistant papaya in Thailand.   From this stakeholder group, 
which has largely been left out of the debate in Thailand, we can draw several 
conclusions. 
(1) The three themes (power, progress, and prevarication) that emerged are not of 
equal weight.  Rather, the decision-making process of farmers seems to be dominated 
by their existing local knowledge and their interest in progress (advancing their 
economic status through the adoption of new technology, Figure 1). 
 (2) Farmer compliance with the existing power structure is more apparent than real.  
Farmers surveyed are eager to gain knowledge from university, NGO and 
governmental agricultural agents.  However, the information they obtain from these 
sources is subject to their existing knowledge funnel, which places more emphasis on 
economic progress than compliance with prevarications that are contrary to their 
existing local knowledge and experience.   
(3) Based on survey responses and evidence of early (illegal) adoption, we can 
conclude that farmers are moving in the direction of adopting of GE papaya.  If 
legalized and made available to farmers, we can surmise that farmers will look 
favorably on the technology and adoption will ensue. 
(4) We can anticipate that there may be long-term effects of prevarications on power.  
If trusted people in positions of power, such as university and government extension 
agents, are re-construed as sources of prevarications inconsistent with local 
knowledge, farmers may lose trust.  There is a clear need for increased and transparent 
communication between these agents and small-scale farmers. 
(5) We need to appreciate the value that small-scale farmers place on progress.  
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Farmer perceptions of insect-resistant eggplant in India are consistent with the results 
of this study: that economic progress dominates the perspective of farmers (Chong, 
2005).  But what about other stakeholders?  Too often, those engaged in the debate 
over genetically engineered crops are people whose livelihoods are not directly 
dependent on agriculture.   We need to expand our understanding of how farmers 
weigh the information they garner in light of their experience as growers, and what 
factors into their decisions about what to plant. 
Who should define progress?  There is a clear discrepancy between politically 
engaged stakeholders as to how progress should be defined through policy. 
Greenpeace SE Asia’s anti-GE campaign organizers hold fast to the belief that 
technology that is not Thai—including GE papaya—is not good for Thailand’s long-
term economic progress (Jiragorn Gajaseni, personal communication). They foresee 
Thailand filling niche markets of high quality, organically produced, non-GM foods 
for export.  In contrast, The Biotechnology Alliance Association (BAA), a pro-GM 
NGO in Bangkok, estimates that if GM papaya were deployed and papaya production 
returned to peak levels, production could increase by 471%, bringing along an 
economic benefit to Thailand of $880,000,000 USD over a ten-year adoption period 
(Sriwatanapongse et al., 2007).  A failure to adopt the technology, the BAA asserts, 
will threaten Thailand’s economic competitiveness with other Asian countries such as 
Vietnam and China, both of which are investing heavily in agricultural biotechnology. 
 In developing countries, 2.5 billion people are dependent on subsistence 
farming and most cannot grow sufficient food (United Nations, 2006).  Advances in 
agricultural biotechnology stand to benefit those farmers.  In order to deliver 
technology to the farmers who stand to benefit from it, policy makers must address the 
gap between scientists, farmers, lobbyists and consumers.  A deeper understanding of 
farmers, those who ultimately will implement the technology, is needed to anticipate 
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their needs and understand their perspective so that products that will enhance their 
livelihoods may be developed and implemented.   
 Innovations are considered to be compatible when consistent with socio-
cultural values and beliefs, previously introduced ideas and when the innovation 
addresses a need (Rogers, 2003).  Based on the results of this study, we can conclude 
that this small subset of Thai papaya growers perceive GE, virus-resistant papaya as a 
compatible innovation that is likely to be adopted by Thai farmers if it becomes 
available.  From this perspective and with the disease at epidemic proportions, one can 
conclude that there is a clear need for the technology, which farmers perceive as an 
agent of progress that will enhance their livelihoods. 
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APPENDIX 
FARMER SURVEY 
Personal Information: 
(do not ask) Record gender:  
Age:  
Occupation (s) skills:  
Highest grade achieved in school:  
Monthly income (or annual):  
(do not ask) Describe house (low medium high for area): 
Number of children:  
Number of people living in house and relationship:  
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Name:  
Address: 
Date of interview:  
 
Papaya Information: 
1. How many mango trees do you have on your property? 
2. Is this more or less than 10 years ago? How many did you have growing 10 years 
ago? What is the reason to grow more or less than 10 years ago? 
3. What is the greatest number of mango trees you have ever had on your property? 
4. How many papaya trees do you have on your property? 
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5. Is this more or less than 10 years ago? How many did you have growing 10 years 
ago? What is the reason to grow more or less than 10 years ago? 
6. What is the greatest number of papaya trees you have ever had on your property? 
7. What else do you grow here (including livestock, fruits, vegetables and commodity 
crops)? 
8. How many times per day or per week do you eat papaya in the form of a ripe fruit?  
From where do you typically obtain the papaya you eat? 
How many times a week do you eat mango in the form of a ripe fruit? From where 
do you typically obtain the papaya you eat?  
How many times per day or per week do you eat green papaya such as that in 
somtam? 
9. Do you eat more or less papaya now that you did 10 years ago?  Why? 
10. What qualities do you like to see in a good papaya fruit? 
11. Do you sell any of your papaya?  If so, what percentage of your papaya do you 
sell?  
12. Where do you sell it? How much do you sell your papaya for (baht per kilo)? 
13. Do you ever trade papaya for other food, goods, or services? (probe for examples) 
14. What is your greatest limitation (s) to harvesting good papaya? 
 
PRSV and disease: 
15. Have you ever heard of the papaya ringspot virus? 
16. Do your trees ever get yellow on top with crinkled leaves, spotting on leaves and 
fruit  and fail to produce normal fruit? 
17. How often do your trees suffer from these symptoms? 
18. What is the proportion of your trees suffered from these symptoms? 
19. Do more or less trees suffer from these symptoms now compared to ten years ago? 
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20. What other disease symptoms do you see on your papaya? 
 
Genetic Engineering: 
21. To create hybrid plants, the pollen of one variety of plant is used to cross-fertilize 
another variety. Have you heard about these methods? Probe for more details. 
22.  As far as you know, have you ever eaten a fruit or vegetable created using these 
methods? 
23.  In general, do you approve or disapprove of creating hybrid plants using these 
methods? 
24. Do you believe that creating hybrid plants using these methods is morally wrong 
or not?  
25. My next question involves word association. For example, when I mention the 
word Bangkok, you might think of the traffic, politicians, the Royal Palace, or even 
foreigners. I am interested in the first thoughts or images that come to mind when you 
think of genetic engineering. 
26. When you think about genetic engineering, what is the first thought or image that 
comes to mind?  
27. Genetic engineering involves new methods that make it possible for scientists to 
create new plants by taking the genes of one organism and inserting them into the cells 
of another plant.  This is sometimes referred to as GMO or biotechnology. How much 
have you heard about these methods? 
28. As far as you know, have you ever planted a fruit or vegetable created using 
genetic engineering methods? 
29. Have you ever heard of another Thai farmer who has planted fruits or vegetables 
using these methods? What kind of that fruit and vegetable? 
30. In general, do you approve or disapprove of creating hybrid plants?  
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31. In general, do you approve or disapprove of creating plants using genetic 
engineering? 
32. Do you believe that creating GMO plants is morally wrong or not? 
33. If a papaya plant were genetically engineered to be resistant to the diseases on 
papaya, would you want to plant this type of papaya? 
34. What do you know about GM crops? 
Other associations: 
35.  Have you ever heard of Greenpeace or BioThai? 
36. What do you associate with Greenpeace? 
37. What do you associate with BioThai? 
38. Have you ever obtained papaya seeds or seedlings from the Department of 
Agriculture Regional Office in Tha Pra? 
39. What do you associate with the Department of Agriculture Regional Office in Tha 
Pra? 
40. From where do you usually obtain papaya seeds? 
41. Have you ever paid for papaya seeds or seedlings? 
42. If you were offered seeds that did not get infected by PRSV would you be willing 
to pay for them?  How much would you be willing to pay for seeds?   
43. If they were GM seeds? 
44. If they were hybrid seeds? 
45. What are your concerns regarding growing papaya? 
46. Have you ever been visited by anyone regarding papaya?  Can you describe the 
visit? 
47.  Is there anything else you would like to say about your experience growing 
papaya? 
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 CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Throughout this PhD endeavor in science writing, my writing was framed by a single 
topic that I thoroughly researched: the controversy around genetically engineered (GE) 
papaya in Hawaii and Thailand.  My goal was to gain a holistic understanding of the 
controversy and write a series of case studies and articles for distinct audiences that 
would accurately inform readers of the issues behind this contention in plant science. 
Perhaps the central thesis that emerges from research is that the controversy 
around GE papaya is not based in science.  Early into my research on the subject, it 
became apparent that the “science”-related arguments against the technology were not 
based in reason and used only to distract a largely uninformed public.  The issues at 
the heart of the controversy had more to do with economics, trade, corporate control of 
seed, and opposition to the larger issue of globalization by western-based 
multinational corporations.  The GE papaya story was particularly interesting because, 
upon examination of the case, it stood up to most of these arguments.  And yet, these 
factors continued to stymie its adoption, mostly due to a lack of accurate information 
being disseminated in the media and by non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
These organizations hold fast to anti-GE agendas and are concerned that approval of 
GE papaya may set a precedent for other crops they find more threatening.  The failure 
for countries such as Thailand to embrace GE, virus-resistant papaya comes down to a 
lack of political will. 
If science is to be hijacked by groups with more media savvy and effective 
communication campaigns, what does this suggest about the ability of science to serve 
the public?  Clearly, science needs ambassadors to effectively steward science policy.  
Who will serve as emissaries of science? 
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In 2007, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 
president, Alan Leshner, challenged university science departments to add media and 
communication training components to their training programs1.  Yet, my own 
experience indicates that the likelihood that university administrators will heed his call 
is bleak.  Traditional faculty appointments in the sciences are made on the premise of 
a strong disciplinary research program.  Recently, a professor in plant breeding 
admitted to me that while, in a perfect world, they may be able to provide graduate 
training in science communication, the reality is that they are struggling to get 
positions approved in core areas such as seed physiology.  Designating a departmental 
position, already limited in number, to teaching communication and writing is not a 
priority.  Existing faculty who remain rooted in their traditional research programs are 
already spread thin, as Leshner admits in his editorial.  The demands to win 
increasingly competitive grants, maintain cutting-edge research, teach at the 
undergraduate and graduate levels, mentor students and serve in administrative roles, 
leave no time to teach peripheral courses such as those in science policy or 
communication.  And few within the science faculty have the experience to do so.   
 Similarly, graduate students in the sciences are overtaxed with courses in their 
field of study, teaching assistantships, and the pressure to publish their research as 
quickly as possible.  How many of these graduate students would be interested in 
courses in science communication?  If made to be degree requirements, as perhaps 
Leshner is suggesting, the number of students enrolling in such courses would require 
that a faculty member be dedicated to this purpose—something departments, already 
with stretched budgets, are unlikely to do.   
                                                
1 Outreach Training Needed, By Alan I. Leshner.  Science 12 January 2007 315: 161 
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Many universities are implementing programs for “writing in the disciplines” 
at the undergraduate level. But the courses are primarily taught by graduate students, 
post-doctoral fellows and only the occasional faculty member.  Few universities have 
created such programs for graduate students, although Princeton University is now 
setting a precedent for this within their engineering school2.  Only time will tell 
whether this type of program will be adopted by other institutions, and whether full-
time faculty will be hired to build such programs.   The post-doctoral positions to 
teach writing in the disciplines are few in number and are largely career dead-ends.  
The experience is no doubt a valuable résume booster, but following the brief three-to-
five year appointments, these fellows usually must return to their specific discipline to 
continue an academic track.  For those who get “too interdisciplinary too early” in 
their graduate careers, such a homecoming may not be possible.  However, outside of 
academia, there is an increasing demand, for professionals trained in science to bridge 
the gap between science and society. 
 
Proposal for a Transdisciplinary Studies Program in the Life Sciences 
As science becomes increasingly collaborative with large genome initiatives, 
research questions at the systems level, and other projects that span the science 
disciplines, a role for science “implementors” emerges.  Within the context of the 
plant sciences, for example, are international partnerships working toward food 
security solutions through global initiatives.  Such projects combine upstream science 
with applied breeding, farmer impact analysis, and consumer acceptance.   These 
inter-institutional efforts require coordination and new means of communication—
they require a new generation of science communicators to guide policy.  The Bill & 
                                                
2 http://web.princeton.edu/sites/writing/WSE/ 
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Melinda Gates Foundation’s unprecedented investment in agricultural development 
has spurred a number of global collaboratives that have re-fueled the CGIAR (the 
Consultative Group in Agricultural Research) system, and engaged the National 
Science Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation and other donors.  These large-scale 
projects offer a new professional path for those trained in life science research, policy, 
and communication.  
A new generation of researchers who are cross-trained in basic life science 
research and elective areas such as policy, economics, and communication is needed.  
Specialists whose focus is not aimed in the center of the traditional disciplines, but 
rather at their boundaries with other fields, will have the capacity to usher the public to 
the frontiers of life science developments.  Such stewardship in communication and 
policy will ensure that the outputs of basic research will have impact on the intended 
downstream users. 
Within the current academic graduate school framework at Cornell University, 
I suggest a six year transdiscipliianry PhD program that integrates expertise in policy 
and communication with research in the life sciences.  This umbrella program would 
integrate “core fields” in the life sciences with “elective fields” outside of the life 
sciences.  In the case of my PhD program, my core field was Plant Biology, and 
elective fields were communication and international agriculture and rural 
development.  The special committee should be composed of faculty members from 
both the core fields and the elective fields integrated into the program.  Table 1 lists 
possible graduate fields at Cornell that could serve as core and elective fields. 
 A student would begin coursework and life science research in their core field 
during year one.  By year three, the core field coursework should be complete and the 
student should participate in an “A exam” during which he or she demonstrates a 
command of the core field subject material to the Master’s level and submits a formal  
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Table1.  Graduate fields for integration in a transdisciplinary program in the life 
sciences at Cornell. 
 
"Core Fields" "Elective Fields" 
Animal Breeding Applied Economics and Management 
Biochemistry, Molecular & Cell 
Biology Art 
Biological Engineering City and Regional Planning 
Computational Biology Communication 
Ecology and Evolutionary 
Biology Development Sociology 
Entomology Economics 
Epidemiology Education 
Food Science and Technology Feminist, Gender & Sexuality Studies 
Genetics and Development Film and Video Studies 
Horticulture Government 
Immunology History 
Microbiology Human Development 
Natural Resources Industrial Labor Relations 
Pharmacology 
International Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
Plant Biology International Development 
Plant Pathology Information Science 
Soil and Crop Sciences Law 
Zoology Management 
  Philosophy 
  Policy Analysis and Mangement 
  Public Affairs 
  Science and Technology Studies 
  Sociology 
  Urban Studies 
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proposal for a transdisciplinary dissertation project.  The PhD candidate then enters 
the second phase of the program: the integration of the elective fields.  The number 
and type of courses the student should take will vary depending on students’ 
backgrounds and goals, but should be agreed upon by the special committee.  In many 
cases, students will find value in pursuing internships and other enriching activities 
outside of Cornell.   
 A trans-disciplinary program of this nature should appeal to funding programs 
such as the National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education and Research 
Traineeship Program  (IGERT), the scope of which is congruent with the program 
proposed here and piloted in my own PhD program.  According to the IGERT 
program guidelines: 
“The Integrative Graduate Education and Research 
Traineeship (IGERT) program has been developed to meet 
the challenges of educating U.S. Ph.D. scientists and 
engineers who will pursue careers in research and education, 
with the interdisciplinary backgrounds, deep knowledge in 
chosen disciplines, and technical, professional, and personal 
skills to become, in their own careers, leaders and creative 
agents for change. The program is intended to catalyze a 
cultural change in graduate education, for students, faculty, 
and institutions, by establishing innovative new models for 
graduate education and training in a fertile environment for 
collaborative research that transcends traditional disciplinary 
boundaries. It is also intended to facilitate diversity in 
student participation and preparation, and to contribute to a 
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world-class, broadly inclusive, and globally engaged science 
and engineering workforce.3 
  
There is a precedent for IGERT –funded interdisciplinary programs at Cornell.  
The Integrated Graduate Training and Research in Biogeochemistry and 
Environmental Biocomplexity4 is now in its twelfth year is currently funded by the 
IGERT program and may, in some respects, serve as a model for PhD programs that 
aim to span the disciplines. 
 
Table 2.  A suggested timeline for a transdisciplinary PhD program in the life 
sciences. 
YEAR Course Activity 
 Research 
Activity  Degree Milestones 
1 core field core field    
2 core field core field    
3 all fields core field  Master-level & A-exam 
4 elective fields integrative   
5 (optional teaching year) integrative   
6 none integrative Complete dissertation 
 
There is an additional lesson in the case of genetically engineered papaya that 
is relevant to the larger discussion of what are often, and inappropriately, called 
“alternative” careers in science.  The success of the GE papaya and other contentious 
crops is not contingent on science or the upstream scientists by whom they are 
developed. Rather, their success lies in the hands of policy makers, economists, 
                                                
3 National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education and Research 
Traineeship Program  (IGERT) 
http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=12759 
4 http://www.biogeo.cornell.edu/ 
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extension agents, the mobilization of farmers and effective marketing to consumers.  
The challenge of taking technology from the laboratory to the field to the fork will not 
be addressed by scientists, but requires the commitment, creativity and skills of 
specialists in areas peripheral to science.  If science is to serve society, we must 
emphasize the role of science communication and science policy.  While donors such 
as the National Science Foundation are wise to expand their mission to invest in large-
scale global projects that stand to help improve the livelihood of those in the 
developing world, it would behoove them to first invest in science implementation.  
Training a new generation of scientists whose specialties lie beyond the bench, in 
areas of science communication and policy, may be a necessary first step.  Otherwise, 
upstream science may only produce more cases of failed and forbidden fruits. 
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APPENDIX A. 
Anatomy of the Writing Process 
In my interdisciplinary program in science writing, my writing goals revolve around 
taking a single topic that I have thoroughly researched: namely, the controversy 
around genetically engineered (GE) papaya in Hawaii and various developing 
countries.  My ultimate goal is to write a series of case studies, articles for my 
colleagues in science and popular magazine-style articles geared towards readers of 
mass media, that all relate to this issue.  In this essay, I describe the process of writing 
an article, “Sweet Science,” which I pitched to the Economist following the political 
coup d'état in Thailand in September of 2006.  I discuss the process I went through to 
bring a scientific issue to the attention of readers of a popular magazine. In accordance 
with the size of articles typical of this magazine, the article is short, limiting the 
amount of the research I’ve done that can be included in the story. 
 In daily and weekly media, timeliness is one of the most critical factors to 
consider.  When pitching to an editor, the writer must convince the editor that the 
subject matter is of particular relevance to current issues, and it is imperative that the 
piece be published now, rather than later.  The so-called “news hook” in this case was 
the coup d’etat in Thailand.  It was my job to weave in the links between the coup and 
the subject of my research—the GE papaya story in Thailand.  Although most of the 
story is not about the effects of the coup, the story introduces a conflict and suggests 
how the change in government may affect the conflict resolution. 
 The conflict in the piece focuses not on the demise of the papaya harvest in 
Thailand or the research challenges in creating a transgenic papaya, but rather on a 
less obvious, but perhaps more interesting, conflict—that of the interests of an 
environmental group and those of big business.  The latter of which, on the surface, 
has little to gain economically from this publicly supported project for poor farmers.  
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The conflict needed to be introduced immediately in the lede paragraph and reads as 
follows: 
 
“Biotech heavyweights are putting up their dukes in a battle with 
Greenpeace over what may be biotechnology’s best bet yet: a virus-
resistant papaya. Oddly, it is a battle over a product that on the 
surface, they have little to benefit from.” 
 
 In the subsequent two short paragraphs, I needed to tell the reader why and 
how the papaya was rendered genetically engineered before returning to the conflict 
itself, which is more explicitly explained in the fourth paragraph.  The first sentence in 
the paragraph that revisits the conflict is intended to remind the reader of, and bring 
the reader back to the conflict that was introduced back in the lede paragraph. 
 
 “So why the hub-bub? International Greenpeace’s Southeast Asia arm and 
  their multinational biotech opponents have one thing in common: They 
both see the bioengineered papaya as a “gateway crop”—a  portal 
through which other genetically engineered crops could creep into 
Thailand. Greenpeace views genetically engineered crops as a threat to 
the safety of the world’s food supply. Large biotech multinationals such 
as Monsanto, although they have not been directly involved in 
developing the DOA’s transgenic papaya, are promoting the promise of 
the papaya hoping that if approved it may open the floodgates for their 
own products.” 
 
 146 
 Following the explanation of the conflict, I step back to inform the reader of 
the key events that escalated the conflict, adding in another timely hook:  the ruling of 
a court case between the Thai Department of Agriculture and Greenpeace.  This could 
have been the primary news hook for the article.  If I had been writing for an outlet 
with an agricultural or biotechnology focus, it would have been a better choice.  
However, for the Economist, an outlet with a more political slant, the coup was more 
appropriate. 
 It isn’t until the last five short paragraphs that I relate how the conflict relates 
to the news hook.  In retrospect, this may have been why the article sat on the editor’s 
desk until it’s timeliness expired and it never appeared in print. A week after the editor 
showed initial interest in the article, she regretted that it would not appear in the 
following issue as there were other articles with convincing reasons to be printed 
immediately.  She followed up by asking me if there was a compelling reason why my 
article should be published immediately.  The urgency of relating it to the quickly 
passing coup news item was clearly not as evident to her as it had been to me when I 
set out to pitch and write the article.   
 The timely hook is buried in the later half of the text.  I would have been wise 
to point out the connection between the conflict and the news hook in the lede 
paragraph and incorporate the two more explicitly throughout the article. In traditional 
journalism, the article in its current form would be more in line with a pyramid-style 
article rather than that of the inverted pyramid typical of news stories.  In the latter, the 
writer assumes the reader will not necessarily make it to the end of the piece and thus 
puts all of the important information at the beginning of the article.  If the reader never 
reaches the end, only more trivial information is missed.  In my piece, I have placed 
my key quotations and tied in my key news hook in final paragraphs, rendering it 
more of a pyramid styled article.  If I were to re-work a subsequent draft I could try to 
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shift some of the coup-related text to the beginning of the article.  As it is written now, 
I think I subconsciously buried the news hook in part because the coup unfortunately 
has rather uninteresting and impertinent ramifications for the story’s conflict or the GE 
papaya story in general.  That is, the change in government is likely to result in a lack 
of action as admitted when the coup is first introduced into the story: 
 
 “But with the recent political putsch and now a new interim 
government, no one knows when the bell will toll to signal the next 
round. With an interim government scrambling to run the show and 
only a year until the new election, few reckon that re-evaluating the 
fate of GE papaya will be on the top of the new cabinet’s agenda.”  
 
  The brief paragraphs that follow really only support the point that nothing is 
likely to happen.  In a sense, this may make the article seem pointless, but it also 
demonstrates one of the biggest challenges to me as the writer.  How can I sell this 
seemingly niche papaya story, when in a larger global context, it isn’t a big issue?  
Perhaps paragraphs that point out the issues’ relative insignificance are better buried in 
the article’s end. 
 In all writing, perhaps one of the first questions I address is, who is the 
audience?  In an earlier draft of this article, my lede paragraph depicted the female 
researcher who struggled to develop a transgenic papaya for Thai farmers and was 
losing against a wavering Thai political climate with regards to genetically engineered 
crops.  After considering my reader—the Economist attracts a largely male audience—
I focused my lede on the battle between big business and environmentalists over GE 
papaya.  The proposed title of the article, “Sweet Science” came about when I 
researched boxing, a sport of which I previously had no knowledge, in order to create 
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metaphor.  “The sweet science” is a historical term for boxing and conveniently relates 
to the papaya fruit itself.  In writing the article, I attempted to engage a more male 
readership that may have an interest in politics, big business, and sports rather than 
creating a sympathetic tone for a female scientist who is failing to realize a solution 
for poor struggling farmers.  The boxing metaphor was carried through by employing 
language such as “biotech heavyweights,” “duking it out,” “rounds” and “tolling 
bells,” while trying to avoid excessive cliché.  I attempted to evoke a curt “male” tone 
by using informal transitional phrases, such as “So why the hub-bub?” or by quoting 
informal language like “new-fangled,” which also may add to the accessibility of the 
article.  Whereas in the first draft the scene was set by depicting a woman scientist, all 
of the direct quotes ultimately used in the submitted draft are male voices. 
 As this article is one manifestation of years of extensive research on 
agricultural biotechnology and GE papaya in several different countries, I have a huge 
amount of research and personal interviews to draw from each time I set out to write 
an article.  A more natural process in professional journalism is probably to establish 
the thesis of the article—the conflict, the hook and the resolution—prior to writing the 
article so that the topically relevant questions are addressed by interviewees that may 
eventually be quoted in the story.  In this piece, the first direct quote came from one of 
the first interviews I conducted two years ago but happened to pertain directly to the 
material addressed in this article.  The second quote was from a person whom I had 
interviewed previously but went back to when writing the piece, knowing he would 
have a relevant and informed perspective on the effects of the coup for the papaya 
controversy.  In two separate quotes he ended up providing the authoritative “thesis” 
or synopsis of the article as the conflict relates to the news hook: 
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I. 
Bangkok-based George Fuller, executive director of CropLife Asia, 
which represents five biotech giants in ASEAN, isn’t holding his breath. 
“Agriculture productivity is not high on the agenda in spite of the fact 
that most of the people in Thailand are involved in agriculture. This is 
related to the Thai bizzarro concept of democracy where only the 
opinions of the Bangkok elite should count.” 
 
II. 
 What Surayud did make clear to his rural audience were his plans to 
put Thai moral values above Western values. What Fuller fears “can 
be an excuse not to go with new-fangled foreign ideas like biotech.” 
 
In order to generate the quotes that linked the issue to the coup news hook, I 
had to ask very directed questions, which I never would have asked when I initially 
interviewed him the previous year.  
Identifying and crafting smaller stories within the context of the larger issue I 
am researching is one of the main challenges of science writing.  As the writer, I have 
to find ways to sell the stories of science to the reader in an engaging way that they 
can relate to, while trying to maximize the number of stories I can compose from a 
limited amount of research.  
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APPENDIX B. 
 
 
Images  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  On the Cover: Editor's Choice: The Next Generation of Biotech Crops 
(Plant Physiology, volume 47) 
 
Genetically engineered (GE), virus-resistant papaya was widely and rapidly adopted 
by Hawaiian growers in the late 1990s. Yet, other papaya-producing countries that are 
plagued with the virus, and that stand to benefit from this technology, have failed to 
approve it. This is despite the fact that GE papaya is close to an ideal ''pro-poor'' GE 
crop. In this issue, one essay (pp. 487–493) examines the political and social factors 
that have stymied the technology in Thailand. An understanding of these factors may 
help stakeholders devise better strategies for introducing the next generation of 
biotechnology crops. Illustration by Evan Clayburg. 
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Figure 2.  Key Players:  Left, Dr. Dennis Gonsalves and his team developed the first 
virus-resistant, genetically engineered papaya for Hawaii.  Middle, Mae Somkhuan 
was one of the Thai farmers who inadvertently received GE papaya seed.  Her trees 
were destroyed as a result of the Greenpeace protest in 2004. Right, Vilai Prasartsee, a 
scientist with the Thai Department of Agriculture spearheaded the effort to control the 
virus in Thailand.  She collaborated with Gonsalves to create a GE, virus resistant 
papaya for Thailand. 
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Figure 3.  An aerial view of the large-scale field trial of transgenic papaya in Hawaii. 
In the center of the field are papaya trees engineered with the coat protein of the virus 
(virus resistant & genetically engineered).  On the periphery are non-genetically 
engineered trees that are susceptible to the virus (photo courtesy of Steve Ferreira). 
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Figure 4.  Hawaiian farmer Willie Julien was an early adopter of GE papaya. Here he 
stands in his GE papaya orchard on the big island of Hawaii. “For me I know the virus 
almost shut me down.  I am not going to go back and plant non-transgenic papaya 
anymore.  It’s too much of a gamble.”  - Willie Julien, 2005 
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Figure 5.  In Thailand papaya is eaten as a nutrient –rich fresh fruit (left), but more 
commonly in unripe form, as the main ingredient in papaya salad (som tam), which is 
being prepared in the photograph on the right. 
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Figure 6.  On July 27, 2004 Greenpeace activists entered the confined field trial at the 
Thai Department of Agriculture Tha Pra station, to protest genetically engineered 
papaya. (photos courtesy of Vilai Prasartsee) 
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Figure 7.  On the left is a third generation GE papaya tree resistant to the virus, grown 
in the confined field trial at the Thai Department of Agriculture Tha Pra station, prior 
to the Greenpeace protest.  On the right is a diseased tree showing symptoms of the 
papaya ringspot virus.  This is the typical state of trees in Thai villages.  The first fruit 
set is mal formed and subsequent fruits do not develop.  The leaves are chlorotic, 
shrink, and soon the trees die. 
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Figure 8.  Currently, the most effective means of controlling PRSV is to cut down 
infected trees before the virus spreads to neighboring trees.  It is only effective in 
orchard settings. 
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Figure 9.  Large-scale farmers in Thailand who produce papaya for domestic 
consumption are beginning to mobilize, eager to have access to GE papaya to control 
the ringspot virus in the orchards. 
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Figure 10.  With the aid of an interpreter, I surveyed forty small-scale Thai farmers in 
four villages about their knowledge and perceptions of genetically engineered papaya. 
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Figure 11.  In August of 2007 Greenpeace left eleven tons of papaya in front of the 
Ministry of Agriculture in protest of the Minister’s intention to push the cabinet to lift 
the ban on field trials of GM crops (photos by Greenpeace). 
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Figure 12.  Isaan Farmers like Mae Kho must now purchase papaya in the market, 
since most trees in the backyard are infected with the ringspot virus.  Here, she 
prepares shredded green papaya for lunchtime som tam. 
 
 
